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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Herbert Vere Evatt, Minister for External Affairs in the postwar period (1941 – 1949), has been 
labelled by his contemporaries, biographers and historians as an internationalist. He is most often 
associated with playing a pivotal role in the formation of the UN, with advocating an independent 
Australian foreign policy and with increasing Australia’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Evatt’s commitment to an internationalist framework was however, mitigated by his adhesion to a set 
of political and legal ideologies that effectively undermined the vision he promulgated for the postwar 
world.  
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Political oratory in the postwar period was infused with the language of internationalism. In 1943, 
former presidential hopeful Wendell Willkie published a travelogue entitled One World in which 
he implored world leaders to cooperate after the war, criticised colonialism and pleaded for racial 
freedom not only in foreign empires but within the United States.1 It was a message that inspired 
Australia’s Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs, Herbert Vere Evatt (1894 – 
1965). Evatt championed the book’s message; that global interdependence rather than 
isolationism was a necessary precondition for world peace.2  After the Second World War the 
prospect of an organisation that would unite the world’s citizens reinvigorated a sense of global 
community.3 Groups that might once have seemed completely disconnected were finding 
congruence in their demands for change in the postwar world. Race was unavoidably on the 
agenda. The Chinese Government, African Americans and emerging nationalist groups in 
colonised countries were all vocal about their demands for global racial equality. During the war 
the American Government had been placing pressure on the old European empires to amend their 
archaic imperial practices.4 When representatives of Allied nations came together at San 
Francisco in 1945 to draft a Charter for the new United Nations (UN), their intention was to 
create an international security organisation that could both alleviate the suffering of many of the 
world’s citizens and avoid ‘the tragedy of a third world war’.5 
  
As Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs under the Curtin and Chifley Labor 
governments (1941 – 1949), Evatt has long been associated with the internationalist impetus of 
                                                            
1 Wendell Willkie, One World (London: Cassell, 1943). 
2 Herbert Vere Evatt, The Task of Nations (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 209, 235. 
3 Norman Bentwich and Andrew Martin, A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), p. vii. 
4 Rudolf von Albertini, Decolonization: the Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919 - 1960; (trans. 
Francisca Garvie), (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 21 -23. 
5 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘The Future of the Pacific’, Pacific Historical Review Volume 14, Number 2 (June 1945), 
p. 145. 
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the postwar period, with pursuing an agenda founded upon universal human rights and 
democratic principles.6 In fact, Evatt’s pursuit of internationalist objectives arose predominantly 
out of his desire to secure for Australia a more central role in international affairs after the war. 
He believed that small and middle powers would shoulder more international responsibility under 
a democratic world order that promoted multilateral and institutional diplomacy.7 In order to 
guarantee Australia an autonomous presence on the world stage, Evatt sought to disassociate 
Australia’s foreign policy from Whitehall. In his personal appearances at world forums and in the 
articles and speeches he presented to the world press, Evatt promoted an ideal of the British 
Commonwealth as a family of equals rather than a collection of weak dependencies reliant upon 
the motherland.8 Finally, Evatt sought to elevate Australia’s status in the Pacific region by 
encouraging the view that Australia was a security power. Evatt saw no discontinuity between 
these various objectives. They were all harmoniously connected to an internationalist vision of 
global cooperation rather than isolationism. He believed that a focus on Pacific security was not 
inconsistent with, but rather was ‘patterned within, the supreme objective of world security’.9 
Similarly he suggested that internationalism and nationalism were ‘closely interwoven’. Evatt 
argued that Australian security, prosperity and democracy were ‘dependent upon the attainment 
of security, prosperity and freedom in other lands.’10  
 
The term internationalist, as it applies to Evatt, has been provided with various ill-assorted 
working definitions by the biographers and historians who have documented Evatt’s foreign 
                                                            
6 Michael Kirby, ‘H. V. Evatt: Libertarian Warrior’, Inaugural HV Evatt Memorial Address Evatt Foundation: 
Parliament House Sydney, 30 August 1991 in Evatt Collection (EC), Folder: Evatt – biographical; Christine de 
Matos, ‘Encouraging 'Democracy' in a Cold War Climate: The Dual-Platform Policy approach of Evatt and 
Labor toward the Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1949’, Pacific Economic Papers No. 313 (March 2001), p. 
3; Sally Loane, ‘Evatt Examined’, Spectrum; Sydney Morning Herald 30 April 1994, p. 5. 
7 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘World Wide Security Found only in World Wide Organization: Great Power Difficulties 
would have been Greater Without the United Nations’, Vital Speeches of the Day Volume 15, Issue 13 (April 15 
1949), pp. 415 – 416. 
8 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘The Outlook of the British Commonwealth of Nations’, EC, Folder: Evatt – Publications. 
9 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘The Future of the Pacific’, p. 147. 
10 Herbert Vere Evatt, Postwar Reconstruction: A Case for Greater Commonwealth Powers (Canberra: L. F. 
Johnston, Commonwealth Government Printer, 1942), p. 41 
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policy since the 1970s. The first point on which historians have disagreed is the extent to which 
Evatt’s commitment to internationalist ideals operated in accordance with his pursuit of 
Australian interests. One particular policy that Evatt defended as being in the nation’s best 
interest was the White Australia Policy. The first comprehensive biography of Evatt was 
published in 1970 by family friend and Evatt loyalist Kylie Tennant.11 Tennant saw no 
incongruity between Evatt’s pursuit of internationalist ideals and White Australia. In her 
biography, Evatt is seen wearing himself out trying to ‘adjust the machinery for peace on earth’, 
‘cajoling, persuading, flinging himself on any lever that would move nations from their ancient 
paths of treachery and violence’.12 Tennant is essentially an apologist for White Australia, 
defending it in terms similar to Evatt as an ‘economic policy’, reminding her readers that Chinese 
immigrants in the Northern Territory had brought leprosy, polluted the water and ‘refused to 
abide by the customs of the white workers’.13 Tennant’s work is the least critical of all the 
biographies produced by Evatt loyalists.  
 
Department secretary and Washington ambassador Alan Renouf, also an Evatt supporter, did 
recognise the extent to which White Australia was irreconcilable with Evatt’s promotion of 
human rights. Renouf argued that this ‘glaring inconsistency’ between Evatt’s liberalism, his 
‘addiction to principle in External Affairs’ and his nationalism never appeared to occur to Evatt.14 
Renouf made no attempt however to understand either the origins of these incompatible 
ideologies or the consequences that they had on the internationalist movement. Both Renouf and 
Evatt’s private secretary, Allan Dalziel, reconciled Evatt’s nationalist and internationalist agendas 
by focussing on his overriding commitment to the principle of justice that they argued permeated 
both allegiances. Dalziel argued that domestic politics never stunted nor impaired Evatt’s vision 
                                                            
11 Kylie Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice (Sydney: Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1970). 
12 Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice, p. 192. 
13 Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice, p. 58. 
14 Alan Renouf, Let Justice be Done: The Foreign Policy of H. V. Evatt (St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1983), p. 101. 
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for an end to colonialism, for the forging of relationships with African and Asian nations, and for 
unswerving support of the principles embodied in the UN Charter.15 Renouf recognised that 
Evatt’s defence of White Australia and his desire to consolidate Australian control over Papua 
and New Guinea were both intended to secure Australian interests. Nevertheless, the extent of the 
inconsistency between these policies and the ideals of internationalism is mitigated by Renouf’s 
focus on the commitment to justice that permeated Evatt’s political philosophy. He wrote that 
Evatt’s ‘driving force was a passion for political, economic and social justice’.16 His commitment 
to Australian control over the trust territory of Papua and New Guinea was justified by Renouf as 
being a commitment to the justice of guardianship.17 
 
The practice of recognising the discrepancy between Evatt’s nationalist and internationalist ideals 
has been continued by less devoted and more analytical Evatt biographers. W. J. Hudson 
described Evatt as a ‘meddling internationalist’ who pursued ‘positive internationalist goals while 
at the same time trying to protect Australian national interests.’18 Paul Hasluck, an Australian 
diplomat who served the Department of External Affairs from 1941 – 194719 credited Evatt with 
a ‘genuine Australianism’ but suggested that his desire to have an Australian voice heard on the 
world stage was often simply an end in itself.20 He criticised the disposition within Australian 
foreign policy to ‘throw stones at street lights just because they are bright’.21 Hasluck also argued 
in his memoir Diplomatic Witness, that Evatt had limited expertise in the areas of international 
affairs and international law, and that his interest in each field was predominantly a result of 
                                                            
15 Allan Dalziel, Evatt: The Enigma (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1967), p. 153. 
16 Renouf, Let Justice be Done, p. 249. 
17 Renouf, Let Justice be Done, p. 250 
18 W. J. Hudson, Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco1945 (Canberra: Australian 
National University, 1993) p. 7. 
19 Christopher Hubbard, ‘From Ambivalence to Influence: Australia and the Negotiation of the 1968 Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty’, Australian Journal of Politics and History Volume 50, No. 4 (December 2004), pp. 
531 and 534; Philippa Macaskill, More than an ‘Imitation Englishman’: Paul Hasluck and the Puzzle of 
Australian Nationalism Honours Thesis, University of Sydney, 2007, pp. 28 – 29. 
20 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 28. 
21 Paul Hasluck, Workshop of Security (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1948), p. 178. 
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political opportunism during and after the war.22 Another of Evatt’s contemporaries, senior 
Australian diplomat Malcolm Booker, believed Evatt’s foreign policy to have been marked by 
‘cynicism and self-assertion’.23  
 
Evatt is often positioned at the beginning of a narrative that is neatly encapsulated by the 
catchphrase ‘from Evatt to Evans’.24 This narrative suggests that Australian foreign policy, as 
distinct from a colonial reliance upon British diplomacy, developed organically from the 
internationalist focus of Evatt’s political outlook, to the ‘good global citizen’ agenda of former 
foreign minister Gareth Evans. It is a narrative that Evans and the Labor Party have themselves 
encouraged.25 Evatt was actively involved in both the formation of the UN and in its operation. 
He was president of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, chaired the Committee on Palestine 
in 1947 and became the General Assembly’s Third President in 1948. The degree to which he 
was committed to the organisation is for many the measure of his internationalist outlook. 
Historian Dean Ashenden has argued that Evatt was ‘seized’ by the compatibility between UN 
functions and Australian needs. Ashenden described the UN as the focus of Evatt’s foreign policy 
                                                            
22 Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs, 1941 – 1947 (Carlton: Melbourne University 
Press, 1980), pp. 26, 27 and 29. 
23 Malcolm Booker, The Last Domino: Aspects of Australia’s Foreign Relations (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1976), 
p. 107. 
24 For example; David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds.), Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign 
Policy (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1997); Ian Russel, ‘Australia’s Human Rights Policy: From Evatt to Evans’, in Ian 
Russel, Peter Van Ness and Beng-Haut Chua (eds.), Australia's Human Rights Diplomacy (Canberra: Australian Foreign 
Policy Publications Programme, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian 
National University, 1992), pp. 3 – 48; Meg Gurry, ‘Identifying Australia’s ‘Region’: From Evatt to Evans’, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs Volume 49, No. 1 (May 1995), pp. 17 – 31. 
25 Gareth Evans, ‘A View from the 1990s’, in Lee and Waters , Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in 
Australian Foreign Policy,  p. 12; Evans looks to Evatt’s policies to enrich the history of Australia’s good 
international citizenship, commitment to the UN and various Asia-Pacific forums, and Australia’s relationship 
with Israel; Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Carlton: 
Melbourne University Press, 1991), pp. 23, 37, 62 – 64, 263; Paul Keating, ‘John Curtin's World and Ours’, 
Speech, Perth, 5 July 2002, available at The Hon. Paul Keating Official Website, 
<http://www.keating.org.au/main.cfm>, accessed at 12 August 2008. 
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and the ‘church of his religion’.26 Similarly, Buckley, Dale and Reynolds depicted Evatt as both 
an ‘unceasing defender’ of the UN and as ‘one of its architects’. 27 
 
Conversely, Evatt’s detractors have argued that Evatt was interested in the UN only as a vehicle 
through which to promote his political career.28 His political contemporaries in opposition 
condemned his commitment to the UN as a contradiction of his patriotism. Percy Spender argued 
that as an internationalist, Evatt failed to be an Australian.29 Billy Hughes criticised Evatt’s 
loyalty to a ‘hopelessly futile, garrulous institution, incapable of preserving peace’.30 In the early 
1990s, the publication of two Evatt biographies, the Buckley biography and Peter Crockett’s 
Evatt: A Life, rekindled postwar ideological debates over Evatt’s internationalism and its 
supposed origins in leftist thinking.31 In a review of the collaborative biography Doc Evatt, which 
had been commissioned by the left-leaning Evatt Foundation, conservative journalist Peter Ryan 
criticised what he perceived as the authors’ preference for a communist methodology. He 
suggested that far from being an architect of the UN, Evatt was only ‘one of the minor plumbing 
contractors’, who brandished a wrench and banged loudly on the pipes. Ryan argued that ‘as the 
foreign minister of a remote country of only 7 million people, Evatt had no hope of influencing 
the ‘untrammelled will of the great powers’.32 Similarly, journalist and director of the Sydney 
Institute, Gerard Henderson accused Buckley of ‘being fossilised in the heady ideological days of 
                                                            
26 Dean Ashenden, ‘Evatt and the Origins of the Cold War: Australia and the US with the UN in Greece, 1946 – 
49’, Journal of Australian Studies Number 7 (November 1980), p. 93. 
27 Ken Buckley, Barbara Dale and Wayne Reynolds, Doc Evatt: Patriot, Internationalist, Fighter and Scholar 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994), p. 302. 
28 W. R. Crocker, Australian Ambassador: International Relations at First Hand  (Carlton: Melbourne 
University Press, 1971), p. 82; Peter Ryan, ‘Pieces in the Evatt Puzzle’, Spectrum; Sydney Morning Herald 13 
November 1993, p. 9. 
29 Percy Spender, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House of Representatives, Volume 294, 5 
October 1949, p. 964. 
30 William M. Hughes, U.N.O., Dr. Evatt and World Peace (Sydney: Boylan & Co., 1949), p. 2. 
31 Bridget Griffen-Foley, ‘This Thing of Darkness: Public Representations of Dr H. V. Evatt’, Public History 
Review Volume 3 (1994), p. 65. 
32 Peter Ryan, ‘Whitewashed by Committee’, Spectrum; Sydney Morning Herald 14 May 1994, p. 8. 
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the 1950s’.33 In his review of Crockett’s biography, Ryan likened Evatt to Stalin and argued that 
Evatt had twisted UN proceedings to obtain personal publicity.34 Accounts of Evatt’s adhesion to 
an internationalist framework have clearly been influenced by Australian party politics and by the 
tendency of some to associate Evatt with postwar communism.35 Yet, even Paul Hasluck who, 
though not an Evatt loyalist, did in his memoirs praise Evatt’s achievements, has suggested that 
Evatt was more concerned with the success of pushing through Australia’s amendments to the 
UN Charter than he was with the ‘emerging international situation’ of the postwar period.36 
 
Despite the tendency of Evatt’s biographers to focus on his pursuit of national interests, there are 
other factors that complicate his reputation as an internationalist. In his body of work on Evatt’s 
role in the partitioning of Palestine, Daniel Mandel argued that Evatt was guided by his ‘ideal of 
furthering the cause of Zionism which he had adjudged to be right’, and that he did so at the risk 
of his ‘fondest ambition, the presidency of the United Nations General Assembly’.37 Likewise, 
Frank Bongiorno has suggested that Evatt’s effectiveness on the international stage was reduced 
by his commitment to outdated models of Commonwealth citizenship.38 Missing from this 
literature on Evatt as an internationalist is a comprehensive exploration of the complexity of the 
                                                            
33 Gerard Henderson, ‘An Old Commie Fesses up About Those Reds Under the Bed’, Sydney Morning Herald 7 
June 1994, p. 15; and Gerard Henderson, ‘Exit Left - A Few Of Those Myths From The Past’, The Age  7 June 
1994, p. 19. For more of Henderson’s criticisms of Evatt see ‘The Irresponsibility Of Evatt Lives On After Four 
Decades’, The Age 4 October 1994, p. 15; ‘No Harm in Some Valuable Introspection’, Sydney Morning Herald 
20 September 2005, p. 13. 
34 Peter Ryan, ‘Pieces in the Evatt Puzzle’, p. 9; For a recent example of Ryan’s criticisms of Evatt see; 
‘Manning Clark's Second Coming’, The Australian 10 February 2007, p. 29. 
35 Lloyd Ross, ‘The Crisis of Australian Labor’ Foreign Affairs Volume 34 (1955), p. 320; see also, George 
Williams ‘The Suppression of Communism by Force of Law: Australia in the Early 1950s’, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History Volume 42, Issue 2 (April 1996), pp. 220 – 240. 
36 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 194. 
37 Daniel Mandel, H. V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel: The Undercover Zionist, (London & Portland: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), p. 273; See also Daniel Mandel, ‘A Good International Citizen: H. V. Evatt, 
Britain, the United Nations and Israel, 1948 – 49’, Middle Eastern Studies Volume 39, No. 2 (April 2003), pp. 
82 – 104, Daniel Mandel, ‘Dr H. V. Evatt at the United Nations: A Crucial Role in the 1947 Partition Resolution 
for Palestine’, Australian Historical Studies Volume 112 (1999), pp. 130 – 151. 
38 Frank Bongiorno, ‘Commonwealthmen and Republicans: Dr. H. V. Evatt, the Monarchy and India’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History Volume 46, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 18 – 39; ‘British to the 
Bootstraps? H. V. Evatt, J. B. Chifley and Australian policy on Indian Membership of the Commonwealth, 1947 
– 1949’, Australian Historical Studies Volume 125, (2005), pp. 18 – 39; ‘H. V. Evatt, Australia and Ireland's 
departure from the Commonwealth: A Reassessment’, Irish Historical Studies Volume 32, Issue 128 
(November 2001), pp. 537 – 555. 
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term as it applied to Evatt. His internationalism was not a fixed principle to which he consistently 
adhered. Rather, it developed out of competing legal and political interests that forced him to 
adopt a range of contingent and often incompatible subject positions.  
 
This thesis will examine Evatt’s commitment to an internationalist framework in light of both a 
contra legalism and his adhesion to a set of political ideologies that effectively undermined the 
vision he promulgated for the postwar world.  The first chapter will explore his proclivity for a 
nationalist approach to international relations. In order to understand the seeming contradiction 
between Evatt’s internationalism and his conservative aspiration to defend and prioritise 
Australia’s interests, the chapter will map out the legal framework that compellingly pervaded 
Evatt’s approach to world affairs. Evatt was first and foremost a constitutional lawyer, committed 
to the legal principles that bound the British Commonwealth of Nations. He was however, 
frustrated with British politicians and had ambitions to disengage Australian diplomacy from 
reliance upon its British counterpart. In spite of this, Evatt remained dedicated to the legal 
relationships that bound the Commonwealth and in particular, to the authority of the Crown as the 
source of governmental power in the dominions. This legal framework ultimately affected the 
degree to which Evatt could advocate the internationalist discourse of the postwar world, in 
particular, in his attempt to force Indian leaders to retain a legal commitment to the Crown in the 
Constitution of their new republic.  
 
The second chapter will explore the relationship between Evatt’s reputation as an internationalist 
and his defence of the White Australia policy. Through an examination of postwar idealism about 
racial equality, human rights and the end of empires, chapter two will make evident the degree to 
which Evatt’s views on race and nation were incompatible with the internationalist ideology to 
which he declared himself committed. Rather than attribute Evatt’s defence of White Australia to 
either an innate racism or to political expediency, the second chapter will flesh out the ways in 
13 | P a g e  
 
which Evatt’s views on race were affected by his participation in the labour movement and his 
attachment to the legal framework provided by constitutional law.  
 
The third and final chapter of this thesis will challenge the image of Evatt as a champion for the 
rights of dependent peoples. Instead of advocating a liberal agenda in debates over the new UN 
trusteeship system at San Francisco, Evatt’s proposals went little further than Britain’s and did 
not fulfil the rhetoric of internationalist idealism that had been popularised during the war. In 
comparison to the proposals of smaller states, particularly from Latin America, the Australian 
view of trusteeship was little more than a reformed colonialism. Evatt was preoccupied by his 
desire to retain control over the trust territories of Papua and New Guinea and to elevate 
Australia’s status as a Pacific power. By employing the gradualist rhetoric of welfare, liberty and 
self-governance, Australia was able to consolidate its hold over Papua and New Guinea in the 
postwar period.  
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Chapter I 
 
The Constitution, The Commonwealth and The Crown 
 
From his early judicial attempts to expand the constitutional power of the Commonwealth 
Government over international issues,39 to his combative style of diplomacy while Minister for 
External Affairs, Evatt consistently demonstrated a clear desire to encourage an independent 
Australian foreign policy.40 He wanted Australia to possess equal, rather than subject, status to 
Britain.41 Evatt’s desire for Australian autonomy in foreign relations was compounded by what he 
considered to be, the indifference shown by the major powers to Australian interests during the 
war. Like many Australian politicians who had gone before him, Evatt was engaged in an 
unrelenting effort to have Australia’s voice heard and considered by the major powers.42 The 
general Australian populace experienced a rapid disillusion after the Fall of Singapore in 1942, 
feeling that the security of Australia was no longer a priority for the British Government.43  This 
disillusion was magnified for Evatt, whose job required him to lobby American and British 
leaders for military aid in the Pacific, when both states had already decided between them to 
prioritise the European theatre and implement a ‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy.44 Evatt was 
                                                            
39 R. v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry [1936] HCA 52. 
40 P. G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901 – 1949 (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p. 140. 
41 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘Australia in British Commonwealth and World Affairs’, Broadcast on the B.B.C., 10 
May 1946, in Herbert Vere Evatt, Australia in World Affairs, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1946), p. 189 – 
192. 
42 C. W. P. Waters, ‘Voices in the Wilderness: H. V. Evatt and the European Peace Settlement, 1945 – 1947’, in 
David Day (ed.), Brave New World: Dr H. V. Evatt and Australian Foreign Policy (St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press, 1996), p. 63. 
43 David Day, ‘Pearl Harbour to Nagasaki’, in Carl Bridge (ed.), Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain 
and the United States Since the 1930s (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991), pp. 54 – 55. 
44 David Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century (Beaconsfield: Circa, 2006), p. 71; Neville 
Meaney, ‘Australia, the Great Powers and the Coming of the Cold War’, Australian Journal of Politics and 
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exasperated by the absence of consultation45 and also by public statements made by American 
and British officials that reiterated the importance of the Atlantic war at the expense of the 
Pacific.46 Australia was denied access to vital executive councils and when admitted was 
presented with issues that they were not expected to consider, giving an impression of inclusion 
that was entirely artificial.47 Evatt often believed that the ‘British were misleading Australia with 
incomplete information’.48 He was not shy when it came to expressing his displeasure with 
British unresponsiveness. He did so explicitly in private cables49 and somewhat more tactfully in 
public speeches.50  
 
This tenacity with which Evatt pursued his ambition for a self-directed Australian foreign policy 
and a distinct international persona has been the focus for many of his biographers and for 
political historians.51 Fascination with both the doggedness of Evatt’s character and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
History Volume 38, Issue 3 (1992), p. 319; See also Warren Kimball, ‘“Merely a Facade?” Roosevelt and the 
Southwest Pacific’ and Carl Bridge, ‘Impossible Missions: H. V. Evatt in Washington and London in 1942 and 
1943’, in Day (ed.), Brave New World, pp. 10 – 29, 30 – 46. 
45 Cablegram, Evatt to Curtin, Document 500, London, 28 May 1942, National Australian Archives, Canberra  
(AA): A4764, 2, in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (DAFP), Volume 5 1941, July - 1942, June 
Historical Publications hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 
<http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vWeb?OpenView>, viewed January to October 2008; 
hereafter referred to as DFAT. 
46 Such as the comment made by the Secretary of the US Navy who stated that the battle of the Atlantic was the 
most important struggle of the war and warned Americans not to expect 'favourable, dramatic developments of 
triumphant American full-scale naval engagements in the Pacific’; see Cablegram, Evatt to Mr R. G. Casey, 
Minister to the United States, Document 291, Canberra, 22 January 1942, AA:A98, DAFP Volume 5, 1941, 
July - 1942, June  DFAT. 
47 Crockett, Evatt: A Life pp. 186, 196, 198; High Commissioner in London, and former Prime Minister Stanley 
Bruce briefed Evatt on his similar concerns. He was frustrated by Britain’s practice of making decisions prior to 
consulting the dominions, making the issues at stake essentially non-negotiable; Note by Bruce of Conversation 
with Evatt, Document 237, 6 July 1943, AA:M100, JULY 1943 DAFP, Volume 6,  1942, July - 1943, 
December DFAT. 
48 Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, pp. 42 – 43. 
49 Crockett, ‘Evatt: A Life’, p. 196. 
50 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘Australia’s Danger and The Organisation of Allied Resources’, Speech at the Overseas 
Writers’ Club at the Hotel Willard, Washington, 28 March 1842, in Herbert Vere Evatt, Foreign Policy of 
Australia: Speeches by the Rt. Hon. H. V. Evatt (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1945), p. 49: Herbert Vere 
Evatt, CPD, House of Representatives, Volume 176, 14 October 1943, pp. 569 – 570. 
51  Biographers include Renouf, Let Justice be Done, p. 291, Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 28; Political historians 
include Carl Ungerer, ‘The Middle Power Concept in Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History Volume 53, Number 4 (2007), pp. 540 – 543; David Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century 
(Beaconsfield: Circa, 2006), p. 73; Coral Bell,  Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy 3rd edition, (St. 
Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Department of International Relations, RSPACS, ANU, 1993), p. 31; One 
notable exception is Malcolm Booker who noted that despite the rapid increase in Australian diplomatic missions being 
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relationships he had with British statesmen should not be surprising. The many examples of Evatt 
irritating British officials provide a rich resource for engrossing historical narratives. At the San 
Francisco Conference he was labelled by British delegate, Charles Kingsley Webster, as 
egotistical, ambitious and malignant. The British were infuriated by his attempt to limit the veto 
(going so far as to ensure that his speech on the issue was not circulated among conference 
members).52 Noted historian on Commonwealth relations, Bruce Miller, considered Evatt to be 
highly nationalistic. He wrote that Evatt’s attitude towards Britain and the Commonwealth was 
‘very much that of picking the eyes out of the opportunities offered, but accepting no 
responsibility for anything that might go wrong.’ 53 On the world stage Evatt did not want foreign 
nations to think Australian policy would blindly comply with British directions. Being keen to 
advocate Australia’s interests at the expense of Britain’s veto power and to advance Australia’s 
position in the Pacific, he wanted to avoid going to San Francisco with any agreed joint 
Commonwealth strategy.54 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden wrote to Churchill from the 
conference, ‘Evatt and Fraser [New Zealand Prime Minister] are making clear to the Americans 
and all concerned that we do not control their voices’.55 These views reflected a broader pattern 
of disagreement between the post-war Labor governments of Attlee and Chifley. The failure of 
British and Australian politicians to agree on matters of policy and approach in international 
affairs provides a framework upon which historians have approached Evatt’s attitude to Britain.56  
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Historical accounts of Evatt’s nationalism have treated it as an ideology that came naturally to 
him.57 In doing so, historians have left themselves free to explore the political consequences of 
that ideology without explaining either its origins or the way in which it was problematised by 
competing concerns. Some historians have recognised the influence that his legal background had 
on his foreign policy. Dean Ashenden, in his examination of Evatt’s role with the UN in Greece, 
argued that Evatt was devoted to the law; ‘for him it was not simply a profession or a social 
institution, but a way of seeing, a construction of reality’.58 Particular attention has been paid to 
his empirical legalism that saw him attempt to resolve complex political questions through a strict 
application of legal rules and procedures.59  He had faith in the ultimate ability of institutions to 
deliver rational outcomes in irrational, highly charged, political situations. Evatt had admired the 
League of Nations as an institution. He did not believe that the League had failed in its 
aspirations, its structure or its covenant; rather, he believed that its member states had failed it.60  
 
In 1946, Evatt offered to act as Counsel for Britain in a dispute before the Security Council over 
Albanian shore batteries and mines destroying British warships in the North Corfu Straight.61 He 
wanted all evidence to be referred to a sub-committee and was concerned that impartiality should 
be seen to be exercised at all stages in order to safeguard the prestige of the new organisation.62 
Christopher Waters mounted a similar argument in regards to Evatt’s involvement in the Iranian 
Crisis of 1946. He suggested that Evatt was anxious for the Security Council to operate in 
compliance with the Charter of the UN and to ensure that its rulings were judicially independent 
and not influenced by the interests of member states. It was through strict adherence to legal 
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procedures that he considered this would best be achieved.63 Despite this recognition of Evatt’s 
commitment to the technicalities of the law, there has been no comprehensive exploration of the 
substance and the parameters of the legalism that influenced his thinking on international 
relations. Scant attention has been paid to the underlying legal framework that influenced Evatt’s 
understanding of British Commonwealth relations. This chapter will explore Evatt’s profound 
belief in the legal ties that bound Britain to her dominions and the way in which this shaped 
Evatt’s internationalist outlook.  
 
Development of a Legal Framework 
Evatt was born in East Maitland, New South Wales in 1894. The fifth of eight sons, he was raised 
solely by his Irish-Anglican mother, a publican, from the age of seven. He attended Fort Street 
High School and then became a resident of St Andrews College at the University of Sydney on a 
full scholarship. At University, Evatt completed bachelor degrees in Arts and Law and a Master 
of Arts all with first class honours. He was later awarded honorary doctorates in Laws and 
Letters. Evatt was exceptionally ambitious. At the tender age of twenty-four he was admitted to 
the Bar. He was involved in New South Wales state politics, primarily as a back-bencher in 
Premier Lang’s Labor government from 1925 to 1930. He was appointed as King’s Counsel in 
1929 and at age thirty-six became the youngest justice of the High Court in Australia’s history. In 
1940, Evatt resigned from the bench to enter federal politics. He served as Attorney General and 
Minister for External Affairs under the Curtin and Chifley Labor governments (1941 – 1949).64  
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In his university years and his early years at the Bar, Evatt became a devoted and successful 
constitutional lawyer. It was at university; under the tutelage of academics such as Mungo 
MacCallum, Francis Anderson and George Arnold Wood that Evatt developed an interest in 
British liberalism and its transferral to Australian soil.65 These academics, well-known for their 
views on British-Australian relations, fuelled Evatt’s interest in the legal, ethical, cultural and 
historical ties that bound Britain to her Empire and to the Commonwealth. 
 
Loyalty to Australia and to the Crown 
In the inter-war years public debate was concerned by the extent to which Australia should 
obediently submit to the requests of Britain. In particular, Australia’s involvement in the Boer 
War (1899 – 1902) and later in the First World War (1914 – 1918) became the litmus test for 
categorising individuals as either republicans or loyalists. Wood had been outspokenly against 
British and Australian intervention in the Boer War. He objected to the unquestioning obedience 
with which Australia supported the Empire when its actions were clearly immoral. MacCallum, in 
contrast, argued that since the war had begun Australians needed to be undivided.66 Although 
Evatt was only a child during the Boer War, his interest in the ethics and politics of the debate 
was revealed many years later in his choice of biographical subject. In 1940, Evatt wrote a 
biography of Labor Parliamentarian, William Holman, who had been a vocal and controversial 
opponent of the Boer War, going as far as arguing that he hoped England would be defeated for 
they were engaged in the ‘most iniquitous, most immoral war ever waged by any race.’67 Loyalty 
to Britain was a difficult subject complicated further by the First World War which even Wood 
supported, proving that ‘loyalist’ and ‘republican’ were not easily defined subject positions.68 It 
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was certainly complex for Evatt who was first rejected for service and then lost two brothers and 
a close friend in the war.69  
 
Warren Kimball has argued that debates concerning Evatt’s role on the international scene: 
 
are but proxy for a bigger battle; the broader, often presentist arguments 
among Australians over national-self consciousness versus colonial 
mentality, over dependency versus an independent foreign policy, over 
nationalism versus the imposed internationalism of an imperial structure.70  
 
Evatt, like many of his generation, had a complex relationship with the idea of Great Britain. 
There is an extensive literature on the origins and character of Australian nationalism. Kate 
Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw and Stuart Macintyre have recently documented the 
historiographical debate in former British dominions over whether there existed an identifiable 
colonial nationalism, as opposed to an extension of British nationalism in the form of ‘pride of 
race’ and attachment to Anglo-Saxonism. Australian historian Neville Meaney, for example, has 
long argued that Britishness was simply a dominant cultural myth in Australia.71  Despite these 
historiographical discrepancies over employing the label of nationalism, historians have 
frequently accepted the existence of a dual attachment to the ideas of ‘Britain’ and ‘Australia’, 
even if only as co-existing, and to a degree, competing, cultural myths. Russell McGregor has 
recently argued that Britishness provided an ethnic core to Australian nationalism, making it 
‘distinctively Australian while simultaneously and fervently British: a composite nationalism that 
could be, and in the federation era often was, more accurately designated ‘British-Australian’’.72  
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In the early period of the twentieth century, federation provided a middle ground between 
republicanism and monarchism that ameliorated the frustrations of many with the hegemony of 
the Crown.  The emergence of the Australian nation as an important member of the British 
Commonwealth presented an opportunity for Australia to evolve out of a position of dependency 
into one of increasing consultation and partnership, while remaining loyal to the motherland.73 
This was the historical context in which Evatt developed his views on British-Dominion relations. 
In his award-winning 1918 university essay Liberalism in Australia, Evatt made clear the way in 
which Australian liberalism and democracy were necessarily different to their British 
counterparts, having evolved out of a distinct history, and not hindered by ‘any closed system of 
political maxims’.74  His argument emulated the views of earlier ‘nationalists’ who positioned 
Australia outside of historically and politically loaded British traditions encumbered by 
discrepancies in class and by corruption.75 Evatt viewed the development of a unique liberal 
tradition in Australia as the source of democratic principle and practice.76 Democracy, to Evatt 
was a fundamental element of the system of values that defined Australia. It would remain central 
to his internationalist vision of the postwar world, being the reason for which Australia would 
fight in the Second World War. In his later promotion of the UN he would argue that it was 
‘imbued with democratic principles,’77 and that it advanced ‘democratic ideals’ by ‘democratic 
procedure’.78 
 
Tension between commitment to the Crown and the nation was complicated for Evatt by his 
involvement with the labour movement. In part, the labour movement was influenced by an 
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emerging group of industrial activists who were working class, Irish Catholic and increasingly 
critical of the hegemony of the British political state in managing Australia’s affairs.79 The labour 
and socialist movements were also infiltrated by a strain of anti-monarchism, the rhetoric of 
which, criticised the corruption, feudalism and ‘outward trappings of power’ associated with the 
throne.80 It was closely associated with a broader anti-imperialist agenda of separation from 
Britain.81 Clearly the relationship between Australia and Britain was a complex one, but what is 
missing from these analyses of Australian identification with the Crown is an exploration of the 
very real legal links that positioned Australia within the web of Commonwealth relations.  
 
The Constitution and the Crown 
Evatt learnt early, again under the tutelage of his professors, that underlying these debates about 
the relationship between Britain and Australia was an important legal and constitutional 
framework.82 Both Wood and MacCallum were leading members of the Sydney branch of Round 
Table groups, established throughout the Empire following the Boer War. The Round Table 
groups advocated the concept of imperial federation, which involved the creation of an imperial 
constitution. The aim of such a constitution was to delegate greater influence to the dominions 
and encourage frequent consultation over the Empire’s affairs.83 Evatt was clearly influenced by 
these debates and in 1917 he contributed an article to the Australian Worker assessing the various 
merits and disadvantages of imperial federation.84 Evatt used this article, written in response to 
one published earlier by Wood, to develop his understanding of the legal association between the 
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Crown and the dominions. He opposed a formal imperial federation, believing that Australia 
should retain its own foreign policy despite its association with a single Westminster based power 
in the eyes of foreign states.85 Evatt argued that a flexible approach should be applied to the 
development of constitutional relationships. Essentially he did not think that a formal document 
was required for Australian nationalism to evolve. He saw the independence of the dominions 
developing organically and fluidly out of pre-existing legal relationships.  
 
Evatt’s views on the British Commonwealth evolved in highly legalistic terms. Throughout his 
career he developed a narrative of Commonwealth development based upon his expansive 
knowledge of constitutional law. This justified, in his mind, the increasing independence of the 
dominions, not as completely separate entities from Britain, but within a fluid Commonwealth 
framework within which all states were equal.86 For Evatt, Australian authority to act 
independently in both domestic and external affairs was absolutely underscored by the legal 
source of that authority, the Royal Prerogative. The Prerogative of the Crown is the source of 
governmental power for a dominion. It is written into the Australian Constitution in the body of 
the executive (being able to exercise the Prerogative in terms of entering into treaties or declaring 
war without the consent of the Parliament) and in the Governor General who can appoint and 
dismiss governments.  Evatt was committed to the idea that the ‘unity and indivisibility of the 
Crown as a legal doctrine is the instrument which enables certain at least of the King’s 
Prerogatives to be exercised with respect to the self-governing dominions of the Empire’.87 He 
defined the Prerogative of the King as an exclusive privilege or right of the Crown that is, in the 
strictest sense, a part of the common law’.88 Evatt argued that the unity of the Crown allows for 
the very existence of those Prerogatives to operate. He contended that the dominions represented 
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‘varying manifestations throughout the Empire of the one Crown’ (emphasis mine)89 and that 
whatever authority is entitled to exercise the Royal Prerogatives, be it ‘Imperial or Dominion or 
Province or Commonwealth or State – it must be accepted as one far-reaching effect of the 
ubiquity of the Crown that its Prerogatives are in existence.’90 Thus the legal principles at the 
very core of dominion power, by their existence, strengthened the unity of the British Crown.  
Historian, J. D. B. Miller, writing in the sixties, recognised that the Monarch had been, ‘at a 
constitutional level, the strongest and most inescapable tie between the old Dominions and 
Britain'.91  
 
As Minister for External Affairs during the Second World War, Evatt remained committed to the 
legal relationship that existed (and exists) between the authority of the Federal Government and 
its constitutional source, the British Crown. In 1948 he argued that what bound Commonwealth 
nations was not the supremacy of the British state, but was rather ‘a common allegiance to the 
Crown’ and their membership of the British Commonwealth.92 In an article written for The Times 
in 1942, Evatt set out what he considered to be the progressive narrative of dominion self-
government. The doctrine of equal partnership promoted at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, 
in association with each dominion’s autonomous membership of the League of Nations and 
acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles, celebrated the ‘living fact of integral unity of the British 
Empire under the Crown’.93 He recognised that dominion independence remained subject to the 
decisions of the League’s British delegates who held plenary powers to act for the whole of the 
Empire, and to the power of the King who could ratify a treaty that would become effective 
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Empire wide.94 This narrative of progression, within which the Empire evolved towards an 
association of self-governing and equal dominions, allowed Evatt to both embrace the tradition of 
imperial kinship ‘which transcends all material links and baffles definition,’95 while still 
advocating a more independent role for Australia on the world stage.  
 
Internationalism 
Evatt’s dual loyalties, to the nation and to the Commonwealth did not operate so smoothly within 
the ideologies of internationalism to which he subscribed. In the immediate postwar years, 
dialogue amongst Commonwealth nations revolved around the Constitution of the newly 
independent India and how its transition towards a republic would affect its status within and its 
relationship to the Commonwealth. The British Government favoured a policy of retaining India 
within the Commonwealth, lest it risk weakening Commonwealth influence throughout its former 
colonies. Evatt was committed to an internationalist vision that rejected the racial objections 
posed by some British statesmen to India’s independence.96 India figured prominently in 
Australian policy making in the postwar period, with its focus upon regional and multilateral co-
operation in line with the new initiatives of the United Nations.97 It was essential that India and 
Pakistan remained within the Commonwealth ‘if for no other reason lest another power occupy or 
extend influence over them’.98 Maintaining friendly relations with India was vital to Australia’s 
political and commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia hoped to strengthen and 
promote an India-Australia sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean zone.99 The importance of 
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‘Indian-Australian collaboration’ was expressly recognised by Evatt.100 As Meg Gurry has noted, 
in 1949, Evatt outlined plans for a regional group which would include India, Ceylon, Pakistan, 
New Zealand and Australia.101 Clearly, India figured prominently in Evatt’s vision of Australia as 
an Asia-Pacific security power in the postwar world. He considered Indian Prime Minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, a personal friend and believed that the future of Asia would depend upon the 
development of ‘the great Indian sub-continent’.102 
 
Despite this, Evatt opposed the breaking of all legal ties between India and Britain. He pushed for 
recognition by India of the King in their Constitution.103 Britain was eager to accommodate 
India’s demands for republican status. British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee realised that the 
historical and political connotations of the term ‘dominion’ were unsuitable and certainly 
undesired by the populace of India, Ceylon, Pakistan and Burma. Mounting Asian nationalism 
demanded a new formula from the Commonwealth that would recognise the equality of its 
members and would place the remnants of empire on the backburner as international relations 
took their natural course in a period of rapid decolonisation. Atlee realised that what was required 
was a negotiated political decision, rather than ‘a lengthy examination by constitutional 
lawyers’.104 He advocated an informal discussion amongst the dominions with the hope of 
coming to some arrangement that would allow India to remain in the Commonwealth as an 
independent state. The sticking point amongst dominion representatives concerned an issue that 
Evatt was well versed in; the King’s Prerogatives. Although Evatt was dedicated to Australian 
involvement in the Asian region and supported efforts to keep India within the Commonwealth, 
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he was determined that any such arrangement should not involve a termination of India’s legal 
link to the King.105  
 
Historian Frank Bongiorno has recently addressed the question of Evatt’s involvement in the 
debates over Commonwealth membership.106 It is an issue to which scant attention has, in the 
past, been paid.107 Bongiorno has argued that Evatt’s constitutional defence of the Monarchy, 
which he had developed in regards to the status of the old-dominions, was inapplicable within the 
context of Asian nationalism.108 Despite Evatt’s advocacy of regional development, he was 
unable to let go of his somewhat rigid understanding of the King’s Prerogatives. The rigidity of 
Evatt’s argument may seem out of step with his belief in the organic, fluid nature of constitutional 
law and Commonwealth relations, but the fluidity of those concepts was never intended to be part 
of a discourse on legal separation from Britain. Evatt believed that the King’s Prerogative was a 
legal principle that should always be applied flexibly.109 He always saw the growing 
independence of the dominions occurring within the framework of the Commonwealth. For 
example, when a Judge of the High Court, Evatt delivered a groundbreaking constitutional 
decision in the matter of R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry110 in which he insisted that there was no 
general limitation on the types of treaties that the Federal Government could enter into under the 
external affairs power, even if the subject of that treaty was not a subject to which general 
legislative power had been delegated to them. In formulating this argument he was drawing on 
the rights and powers delegated to the Federal Government, through the Constitution as an 
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extension of the King’s Prerogatives. Essentially the Government would be exercising the King’s 
powers on his behalf. Bongiorno has argued that for Evatt, ‘the prerogative provided kingship 
with its substance at the dominion level, and in the larger setting of the British Commonwealth’. 
The monarchy was not merely ornamental, but: 
 
legitimised dominion autonomy through the common law. The Monarchy, 
for Evatt, was not a symbol like a flag; it was the ultimate source of national 
power, and the most significant link between members of the British 
Commonwealth.111 
 
Thus, while Evatt could envisage a Royal Prerogative that would bend to meet the needs of the 
Commonwealth Government when extending its constitutional power to control external 
affairs,112 he could not envisage a Commonwealth that could be bound by any contractual 
principle other than the Prerogatives and the unity of the Crown. 
 
Evatt wanted India to retain a link to the Crown, at the very least, through its external affairs. At 
Commonwealth Meetings in Paris in 1948, he lobbied the Secretary-General of India’s Ministry 
of External Affairs, Sir Girja Bajpai, to maintain a link with the Crown that would involve the 
King continuing to ‘exercise Prerogative functions in relation to India's external affairs’.113 What 
this ‘link’ would mean was essentially the same principle Evatt espoused in Burgess. The source 
of India’s legal personality in the international milieu would be the British Crown. Indian 
delegates would be able to operate completely independently of the Crown, but in a legal sense, 
their authority to do so would stem from the delegation of monarchical power to the Indian 
Government. When Evatt was made aware of the ‘Ten Points’ drawn up by Nehru, which set out 
the conditions upon which India would remain in the Commonwealth,114 he was ‘amazed’ by the 
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absence of any Prerogatives and by the watering down of the Royal link ‘to a stage that it was 
hardly discernible’. Australia’s High Commission in London, J. A. Beasley, noted that during 
negotiations Evatt continued to ‘stoutly’ maintain the attitude that a direct link with the King 
must be preserved.115  
 
By the beginning of 1949, the British Government had given up trying to appease dominion 
concerns about the Royal Prerogative. Recognising that India would not accept a constitutional 
link to the King, discussion turned to ‘whether a sovereign democratic republic owing no 
allegiance to the Crown could remain within the Commonwealth.’116 Bongiorno has documented 
the way in which Evatt was effectively sidelined in the negotiations towards the end of 1948, 
being replaced by a far more pragmatic Chifley.117 His public statements on the importance of the 
Crown and the old ties of kinship to the Commonwealth had made him somewhat of a liability.118 
Chifley was more willing to accept the futility of the British position. He conceded that although 
‘there would be very great difficulties in retaining India within the Commonwealth should it 
become a republic’, the most important concern remained the maintenance of friendly relations 
with India, which Chifley hoped would act as a bulwark against communism in Asia.119 Evatt 
viewed the Royal Prerogative as far more than a legal fiction. He considered allegiance to the 
Crown to be an enduring reality. In the postwar period however, when legal certainties were 
overrun in popular discourse by the ideals of equality, anti-colonialism and human rights, Evatt’s 
adhesion to a legal structure created in the nineteenth century meant that his policies involved 
more nostalgia than political expediency. 
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Chapter II 
 
White Australia and the Formation of the United Nations 
 
Evatt’s reputation as an internationalist has arisen predominately out of a common view that he 
acted as one of the main protagonists at the San Francisco Conference. He is lauded as a 
‘champion’ and the ‘most formidable and successful representative’ of the smaller powers.120 
Gareth Evans has described Evatt’s contribution to the conference as ‘the stuff of which legends 
are made’ and has suggested that it is, ‘above all, the Evatt of San Francisco who deserves to be 
remembered’.121  His contemporaries similarly regarded Evatt as a powerful force at the 
Conference. Chairman of the US delegation and Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, announced 
that ‘no one had contributed more to the conference than Mr. Evatt’.122 Belgian delegate, Henri 
Rolin, paid ‘personal tribute to that veteran of all committees and all commissions... Dr. Evatt’.123 
Even the New York Times labelled him as the ‘most brilliant and effective voice of the small 
powers, a leading spokesman for the world’s conscience’.124 
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In spite of the praise, the positions that Evatt took on various matters at the Conference were not 
consistently in pursuit of internationalist ideals. At San Francisco Evatt pressed for an 
amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks draft Charter that would effectively curtail the ability of the 
UN to propose recommendations when the domestic policies of states were threatening 
international peace and security. The basis for this amendment was a concern to safeguard 
Australia’s racially discriminatory immigration legislation. Scholars of Evatt have recognised the 
degree to which this provision was inconsistent with his professed internationalism.125 Yet the 
research on this inconsistency has treated the tension between Evatt’s idealism, rooted in the 
discourse of human rights, and his protection of a fundamentally racist law as representing either 
his naturally Australian propensity towards racism, or a blip in an otherwise unblemished 
internationalist record. This chapter, in contrast, will map out the extent to which Evatt’s 
amendment went against the grain of international ambition after the Second World War to 
formally realise universal racial equality. It will make evident how Evatt essentially 
compartmentalised his internationalist vision for a postwar world from the question of racial 
equality and it will examine the way in which his views on race and immigration were derived 
from his involvement in the labour movement, and his adhesion to a constitutional and legal 
framework.  
 
Dumbarton Oaks, 21 August – October 7, 1944 
In late 1944, the four major Allied powers, China, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington to draft a Charter for a new world security 
organisation. On the agenda was the question of human rights and the degree to which such rights 
would be acknowledged and upheld in the Charter. The Chinese delegates immediately made 
clear their intention to secure racial equality as an underlying principle of the new UN. In taking 
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upon themselves the mantle of racial equality, the Chinese delegates were continuing a struggle 
for its universal recognition that had been initiated by the Japanese at Versailles in 1919.126 The 
Chinese proposed that the new UN should uphold the ‘principle of equality of all states and all 
races’.127 Their proposal was not supported by any of the other powers.128 Despite the prevalence 
of a discourse on human rights within American public rhetoric during the war129 the American 
delegation opposed specific reference to race or discrimination on the grounds that it might invite 
international intervention in their domestic segregation laws.130 An American commitment to 
international recognition of human rights was an influential ideal in the State Department during 
the war. By the time the American contingent arrived at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 however, their 
approach to the question of human rights had been tempered on the recommendation of legal 
experts. American strategy was to support the ideal in principle, but not to consent to the 
establishment of any means by which rights could actually be enforced.131 In contrast to the 
Chinese proposal the Americans suggested a broad principle for the preservation of ‘human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’.132 The British and the Soviets opposed both American and Chinese 
proposals essentially on the grounds that a provision on human rights would undermine the 
principle of national sovereignty and allow international interference in the domestic affairs of 
states.  
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The Soviet representatives were aware that Stalinist policies of ‘coercive collectivisation, 
political purges, internal exile and forced labour camps’ would not be easily reconciled with the 
principle of human rights.133 Their diplomatic explanation for opposing the provision was that the 
philosophy of human rights was ‘not germane to the main tasks of an international security 
organization’.134 The British delegation was concerned that formalising the preservation of 
human rights would undermine sovereignty and imperial power.135 Although the British formally 
objected to the proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks, diplomat Sir Alexander Cadogan, implied 
that Britain would support human rights in principle if they could safeguard their domestic affairs 
in practice. In September 1944, during the Dumbarton Oaks talks, Cadogan advised the foreign 
office that it ‘would be against our interest and tradition as a liberal power to oppose the 
expression of a principle, denial of which figures so predominantly in Nazi philosophy and is 
repugnant to the mass of British and foreign opinion’. Cadogan was also acutely aware of the 
ammunition that a British denial of human rights would give to the American critics of Empire, 
whose anti-colonial opinions had become much louder during the war. Like the Americans, 
Cadogan advocated recognition of the principle without conceding that matters of domestic 
jurisdiction would become subject to UN scrutiny.136  
 
San Francisco, April 25 – June 26, 1945 
In early 1945, delegates from fifty allied nations met in San Francisco to consider the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals and to finalise the Charter. The aim of the Charter was to define the new UN; its 
principles, its structure, the limits upon its capabilities, and its potential. Discussion was heavily 
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influenced by the philosophical and legal movements that emerged from previous conflicts and 
their resultant peace efforts, such as the development of human rights and Westphalian notions of 
sovereignty. The precursor to the UN, the League of Nations, provided a structural precedent 
while the two world wars that had marked the first half of the twentieth century provided the 
motivation. Australia’s delegation to the conference was led by Deputy Prime Minister Francis 
Forde. Despite Forde’s seniority, it was Evatt who effectively led the delegation, exhaustively 
campaigning for Australia’s amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.137 
 
The atmosphere at Dumbarton Oaks had not been conducive to the Chinese campaign for racial 
equality. The final draft, which was forwarded to all states and non-state actors who would be 
attending the San Francisco Conference, included only one reference to human rights. Under the 
chapter dealing with arrangements for international economic and social cooperation was an 
undertaking that the organisation would ‘promote respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’. There was no reference to race, ethnicity or discrimination. The only suggestion of 
equality was ‘the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states’ upon which the organisation 
would be based.138 Despite the attitudes of the major powers the majority of delegates at San 
Francisco were determined that the Charter would include recognition of universal human rights. 
Jan Burgers has identified the Latin American delegates and the US non-governmental groups as 
having had significant influence over the improvement of the human rights clauses in the final 
Charter. The US had representatives of forty-two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) acting 
as consultants, including religious, women’s and labour groups all of whom had been 
campaigning for human rights during the war.139 Although the only African American 
organisation asked to attend was the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured 
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People (NAACP), Marika Sherwood has made clear that lobbyists and students from Africa, as 
well as African American residents, were influential in their unrelenting efforts during the 
conference to lobby both the press and delegates whom they believed would be sympathetic to 
their cause.140 
 
The Question of Race 
Denial of rights and racial prejudice during the war were not only present in Nazi policies. As 
Gary Gerstle has argued, the Second World War was in very large part a ‘race war’,141 fought for 
the defence of racial purity both in the Pacific and the Atlantic.142 The Holocaust had signalled a 
significant departure from traditional forms of anti-Semitism in Europe, employing scientific 
discourses to segregate individuals into categories of Jew and non-Jew.143 The racial element of 
Nazism had posed less of a threat to the Allies than Hitler’s expansionist policies, for, as Hugh 
Tinker has argued, many people in western democracies accepted the Nazis’ philosophy of racial 
difference.144 Anti-Semitism had indeed developed, and to some extent been normalised, within a 
broader Euro-American milieu.145 Race was also a significant element in the Pacific war, 
revolving around the difference in colour between enemies. Creators of propaganda from both 
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sides animalised and belittled their opponents.146 Michelle Brattain has argued that the ‘tenacity 
of racism’ was revealed by the incarceration of Japanese Americans, segregation in the armed 
forces147 and race riots, and was founded upon beliefs in the innate inferiority or superiority of 
certain races.148 
 
Despite the prevalence of racial inequity, the question of human rights had become increasingly 
significant as the war progressed and news of atrocities, committed not only against minorities in 
Europe but against prisoners of war in the Pacific, reached the press in allied countries. The 
resurgence of rights-based discourses fitted into the professed liberal ideology of the Allies and 
discredited the opposing axis systems of fascist governance.149 By the time Allied nations had 
arrived at San Francisco in April 1945, the enormity of the war’s consequences was being 
realised. Elazar Barkan has noted that Nazism compelled a collective recognition of the dangers 
that could result from a misuse of the concept of race and led to a ‘discrediting of racism’ in 
intellectual discourse.150 John Dower has described this process as constituting a ‘revolution in 
racial consciousness’.151  
 
At San Francisco, under pressure from smaller non-western states and NGOs, the major powers 
agreed to include in the Charter various references to human rights. The peoples of the UN 
determined to ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.’ They agreed to 
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‘practice tolerance’ and to promote and encourage ‘respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’.152 There was however, 
a notable absence from the Charter of the means by which these rights could be enforced.153 
International law expert Hans Kelsen argued in 1946 that the Charter failed to impose upon UN 
members an obligation to grant rights and freedoms to their citizens. Nor did the Charter provide 
a means by which individuals could appeal to an international body. The jurisdiction of the newly 
created International Court of Justice (ICJ) extended only to state actors and provided no recourse 
to judicial intercession for individuals.154 The final nail in the coffin for protection of human 
rights was the insertion of a clause protecting all members from intervention by the UN in matters 
considered to fall within their domestic jurisdiction. This safeguard, in Article 2 (7), became a 
‘basic principle’ of the Charter at the suggestion of the major powers and as such it operated as a 
restriction upon the entire working of the UN.155 The Article did however, contain a condition 
whereby any domestic matter could still come under Security Council scrutiny if it required the 
Council to determine or act on a threat to the peace or act of aggression.156  
 
Evatt’s amendment to Article 2 (7) 
Evatt did not believe that this provision went far enough in securing the interests of smaller 
nations against intervention from the UN. In his view, while the permanent members of the 
Security Council could safeguard their interests through the use of their veto power, the 
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remaining 45 member states were left vulnerable.157 Evatt sought an amendment to Article 2 (7) 
to ensure that the only permissible intervention by the UN in matters of domestic jurisdiction 
could be an application of the enforcement measures granted to the Security Council under 
chapter VII of the Charter.158 This amendment essentially proposed to remove from the Security 
Council their power under Articles 39 and 40 to make recommendations or take provisional 
measures when a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression arose within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state.159  Under Evatt’s amendment the Security Council would only be 
able to intervene if the domestic situation required the drastic military enforcement measures 
authorised in Article 42. 
 
Evatt was concerned that without this qualification the Security Council could deal not only with 
acts of aggression but also with their causes, for example a discriminatory immigration policy.160 
He foresaw the use or threat of force becoming an attractive option for states seeking to extort 
political concessions by bringing a matter within the ambit of UN scrutiny.161 The relationship 
between this amendment and White Australia was conspicuous. Evatt and Forde cabled Chifley 
on May 18, arguing that without this ‘essential’ provision: 
 
it would be possible for an Asiatic Power to object to our Migration Policy and if it 
could be shown that a threat to peace had arisen the Security Council could 
proceed to recommend a settlement involving change in our Migration Policy as a 
condition necessary to remove the threat. 162 
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They regarded the matter as one of ‘fundamental importance’ upon which they believed there 
could be no compromise.163 Evatt was the chief protagonist impelling acceptance of Australia’s 
position. As Paul Hasluck has made clear, there was no real conflict on policy at the Conference 
between Evatt and Forde ‘because only Evatt made the decisions’.164 
 
Evatt was successful in his campaign to expand the prohibition on intervention in the domestic 
affairs of states. However, that ‘success’ arguably negated the value of his other amendments, 
restricting, as it did, the whole working of the organisation. Evatt had negotiated the expansion of 
the General Assembly’s powers of discussion165 despite persistent opposition from the Soviet 
Union.166 He saw the strengthening of the General Assembly as an important means of restraining 
any ‘capricious or unjust exercise of the veto power’.167 Evatt viewed his role in strengthening the 
Assembly as a great achievement. Drawing on his commitment to democratic principles, Evatt 
saw the Assembly as the ‘most democratic organ’ of the UN and as a ‘vital world forum with the 
ability to act as a ‘watchdog’ on all other organs.168 He argued that no state ‘could ignore the will 
of the peoples in the world, expressed through the Assembly’.169 Yet, for all Evatt’s self 
aggrandisement over his role in expanding the General Assembly’s powers of discussion,170 he 
was operating the whole time with the belief that Article 2 (7) overrode all other powers granted 
to the Assembly.171 As British delegate (and Evatt detractor) Charles Webster noted in his diary, 
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Evatt advocated ‘the greatest possible extension of power to the General Assembly while at the 
same time fighting perversely to limit it by domestic jurisdiction. This latter is now the only gap 
in the Charter, if indeed such a gap really exists...’172 
 
Webster’s observation that the insertion of Article 2 (7) gave rise to a ‘gap’ in the Charter is 
interesting, suggesting that in the postwar period, international opinion might have been ready to 
embrace an organisation with a more interventionist approach. It was certainly a shared global 
desire that the UN would have the legal capacity, the support and the resources to maintain peace 
and security in a more effectual manner than the League had been capable of. Historians and 
lawyers writing about the formation of the UN during its early years paid considerable attention 
to the debates at San Francisco over the wording of Article 2 (7). In so doing, they noted Evatt’s 
role in pushing for a more expansive prohibition than even the major powers had originally 
intended.173 The racial motive behind the amendment was not concealed at the conference. 
Malcolm Booker has noted that in spite of Australian support for human rights, ‘none at the 
United Nations was misled as to Australia’s real motives’.174 Evatt stated expressly at San 
Francisco that Article 2 (7) was a defensive mechanism in response to pressure brought by Japan 
before the war upon the Australian Government to change its immigration policy.175 When 
campaigning for the extension of General Assembly powers, Evatt had reminded Soviet delegate 
Andrei Gromyko that Article 2 (7) would ban the UN from intervening in Soviet immigration.176 
Evatt had been advised by the foreign office, in a special memorandum prepared in early June 
1945 and entitled ‘World Organization: Racial Equality and Domestic Jurisdiction’, not to 
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express his concerns about immigration policy too explicitly at the conference, lest he embarrass 
India or provoke ‘awkward debate on the colour question’.177 The protection of White Australia 
was thus the acknowledged and underlying purpose of Australia’s proposals to further strengthen 
Article 2 (7). 
 
Objections to the Australian Amendment 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Chinese delegation opposed the Australian amendment, 
arguing that any limitation of enforcement measures would be irreconcilable with the primary 
objective of the UN to maintain peace and security.178 In 1942, during negotiations for the 
abolition of extra-territoriality between China and Australia, F. W. Eggleston, Australian Minister 
for China, explicitly acknowledged Evatt’s aversion to any clause that may ‘break down 
immigration laws and give the Chinese the right of entry.’ To avoid such a scenario Eggleston 
devised a reciprocity clause whereby both China and Australia had the right to protect their 
domestic immigration laws. Eggleston had advised Evatt to talk of an ‘immigration policy’ rather 
than a ‘White Australia’ policy to avoid controversy.179 It is evident from this cable that as early 
as 1942 the Australian leadership was employing ‘domestic jurisdiction’ as a defence to 
accusations concerning immigration restriction and were convinced that such a justification 
would receive ‘world-wide support’.  
 
The French delegation had originally objected to any curtailment of the organisation’s right to 
intervene, stating explicitly that ‘experience of recent years’ had made intervention desirable to 
protect ‘certain unfortunate minorities’. The French had previously suggested their own 
amendment, completely antithetical to the Australian, which suggested that the ban on 
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interference in domestic matters may be overridden by ‘a clear violation of essential liberties and 
of human rights’ which in itself ‘constitutes a threat capable of compromising peace’.180 While 
both France and China were clearly protected by the veto power (and the French ultimately 
withdrew their amendment), smaller states such as Norway also argued that Article 2(7) was 
‘tantamount to imposing on the working of the system of international investigation and 
conciliation very severe limitations’ which may jeopardise international peace and security.181  
 
The debates over the Australian amendment clearly demonstrate that small states, including the 
Latin American and Eastern European states that had campaigned for the inclusion of human 
rights provisions, were concerned to protect their own domestic affairs from Security Council 
interference. However, prior to Evatt’s proposal being circulated there had been little concern 
over the original wording of Article 2(7). In fact, on 17 May, when debating the original major 
power proposal for Article 2 (7),182 several delegates felt that the major power amendment should 
not be accepted, ‘since the council should not be debarred from taking necessary action on the 
plea that such action might be interpreted as interference within domestic jurisdiction’.183 
Australia then proposed its amendment and on June 5 asked permission from the Committee to 
postpone discussion of its amendment until negotiations with other delegates had been 
completed.184  
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Evatt was aware of the value that most sovereign states attached to domestic jurisdiction clauses. 
There had been a prohibition similar to Article 2 (7), although less restrictive, in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations185 and safeguarding the domestic jurisdiction of states had been common 
practice in international treaties and arbitration agreements prior to the First World War. Under 
such arrangements contracting parties would agree to withhold from arbitration matters affecting 
their ‘vital interests of national honour’.186 In the interwar years states continued to contract out 
of their obligations to the League by employing domestic jurisdiction clauses that contained no 
provision whereby the applicability of such a clause would be determined by an impartial 
body.187 Evatt was well aware of the prohibition’s appeal and relied upon it at San Francisco 
when attempting to garner support for his amendment. Evatt took advantage of a sense of 
vulnerability among smaller states over the expansive veto power of Security Council members. 
Many of these smaller states, who had supported Evatt’s attempt to limit the scope of the veto, 
were colonies of, or were politically indebted to, one of the major powers. State sovereignty was 
therefore not an issue they took lightly. Evatt reminded delegates that Australia was not alone in 
having potentially offensive domestic policies, maintaining that ‘every country... has its own 
internal problems, its own vital spheres of domestic policy, in which it cannot without forfeiting 
its very existence as a state, permit external intervention’.188 The possibility of intervention 
vocalised by Evatt at the conference led to a majority of members passing his amendment in 
patent contrast to the rhetoric of human rights that had animated the conference.  
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Despite the stand taken by members in support of Evatt’s position, he was still acting in 
opposition to the internationalist ideals of the postwar period. These ideals were not forfeited by 
all attendees at the conference under threat of Article 2 (7). The NGO advisers continued to push 
for a rejection of both Article 2 (7) and the dated notions of sovereignty that underlined it, in 
favour of human rights. International legal academic Phillip C. Jessup argued in dramatic fashion; 
‘we have taught the layman to worship the arch-fiction of the sovereign state and thereby have 
built a Maginot line against the invasion of new ideas in the international world, and behind that 
rampart the demagogue and the reactionary are enthroned’. James T. Shotwell, Director of 
Economics and History at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the 
consultants to the US delegation, adopted a similar line of reasoning. He argued that the Second 
World War had made it clear that a regime of violence and oppression within any nation of the 
civilized world was a matter of concern to all the rest. He advised that states, jealous of their 
sovereignty, should no longer regard foreign expressions of concern for the welfare of citizens as 
constituting interference in their domestic affairs.189 
 
The thinking behind Evatt’s amendment was ideologically in line with American anxieties over 
safeguarding segregation and with British concerns for imperial power over colonies. It was in 
essence an extension of the discourse promulgated by Billy Hughes at Versailles in 1919. The 
result of Evatt’s amendment, if applied literally, would have been to castrate the UN, leaving it 
unable to fulfil the objectives of his postwar internationalist vision.190 Yet the allied powers had 
fought the Second World War under the banners of democracy, freedom and equality191 and the 
preservation of such liberties was a cause to which Evatt had pledged himself on many 
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occasions.192 While Evatt was clearly aware that Article 2(7) would safeguard an immigration 
policy that restricted entry to Australia on the basis of race, his understanding of racial 
discrimination was not easily categorised by simple reference to race hatred or allegiance to 
ideals of racial purity. Evatt’s palpable concern over the threat that UN intervention may have 
posed to White Australia had complex origins. There is little evidence to suggest that he was 
openly hostile to other races.193 In contrast, Evatt’s defence of the policy developed out of his 
adherence to two somewhat incongruous philosophies; a legal faith in the constitutional and 
sovereign rights of the Federal Government to make such laws and a commitment to preserving 
workers’ rights that was fundamental to the Labor Party and to the international socialist 
movement. 
 
A Constitutional Framework: The Rights and Powers of Sovereign Australia 
Evatt was appointed to the High Court in 1930 at the age of thirty-six and served on the bench for 
a decade. In his judicial decisions on immigration he demonstrated an ‘intimate knowledge of the 
exclusion provisions of the Immigration Act’.194 His judgments also revealed that his interest in 
immigration law was profoundly influenced by his expertise in constitutional law and by his faith 
in the right of the Commonwealth Government to exercise its Royal Prerogative. Evatt argued 
that the power to legislate on the subject matter of immigration was clearly delegated to the 
Commonwealth Parliament in the Constitution.195 That power ‘authorises legislation directed to 
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the prevention of the entry of any person who is not... a member of the community of 
Australia’.196   
 
In 1934, he delivered judgment in favour of detained Czech communist Egon Kisch when the 
Federal Government had attempted to prohibit him from entering the country. Evatt’s biographer 
G. C. Bolton described the case as a notable victory for civil liberties197 despite the fact that Evatt 
had actually upheld the validity of the law under question. Evatt found that the section of the 
Immigration Act that allowed the Government to declare someone a ‘prohibited immigrant’ for 
the purpose of their exclusion or deportation, was perfectly valid because it was a law which in 
substance fell within the subject of immigration. Evatt ordered Kisch’s release from detention, 
not on the grounds that the Government had no legal right to declare someone a prohibited 
immigrant or to subsequently detain them, but because on the facts of the case Evatt found no 
evidence that Kisch was in fact a prohibited immigrant. Evatt acknowledged the drastic character 
of the law, but argued that it was ‘no more drastic than the power which enables non-Australians 
coming to Australia to be made prohibited immigrants if they fail to pass a dictation test’.198 
 
While on the bench Evatt exercised relative freedom in being able to speak his mind on White 
Australia. His judicial oratory made evident that he had an extensive knowledge of the political 
reality of racially discriminatory legislation. In R v Davey Evatt declared that the dictation test 
used to exclude undesirables of non-European background: 
 
was never intended to be a real education test, or a provision guarding 
against the entry of illiterates. It was merely a convenient and polite device... 
for the purpose of enabling the Executive Government of Australia to 
prevent the immigration of persons deemed unsuitable because of their 
Asiatic or non-European race.199 
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He suggested that it was both common knowledge and official policy that the test ‘was never 
intended to be applied, and would never be applied, to immigrants of an European race’.200 It was 
also clear however, that Evatt was willing to uphold any legislation that he believed the 
Government had a constitutional right to enact. Furthermore, he never challenged the 
Government’s defence of the policy, which he himself had advocated at international forums in 
the 1920s, as being a necessary condition to preserve an Australian standard of living.  
 
In the first half of the twentieth-century race thinking was not neatly divided along colour lines. 
In 1926, J. H. Curle published his eugenicist polemic To-day and To-morrow: The Testing Period 
of the White Race, which reinvigorated an imperial discourse that placed the British at the zenith 
of civilisation and located southern and eastern Europeans as the ‘dregs of Europe’. The 
whiteness of a person’s skin was not the definitive measure of their inclusion in white 
civilisation.201 In 1935, Evatt wrote an article detailing the riots that had erupted in Kalgoorlie the 
previous year between Australians on the one side and Eastern and Southern European 
immigrants on the other. Evatt attributed the violence to an inflammation of racial animosity 
between different ethnic groups, who were predominantly segregated and all struggling to make a 
living in the mining areas around Kalgoorlie. Despite this clear acknowledgement of racial 
disharmony, Evatt’s interest in the affair was excited by the constitutional question of whether the 
issue was one of law and order, or one of foreign relations, and as such, whether the matter then 
fell to the State or Federal Government to resolve.202 Similarly, despite having travelled to 
California at the request of Billy Hughes in 1920 to examine racial tension between the 
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Americans and Japanese,203 his analysis of the exclusion and mistreatment of Japanese students 
by Californian schools was preoccupied by the question of whether, under the American 
Constitution, the matter was one for the Central or State Governments.204 His understanding of 
interracial relations, in both the domestic and international spheres, was evidently greatly affected 
by his habit of elucidating political problems in legal and constitutional terms. 
 
White Australia, the Labor Party and Universal Socialism 
Evatt’s support for the White Australia policy is made somewhat problematic by his membership 
of the Labor Party and his dual responsibilities to endorse the Party’s platform and represent its 
electoral interests. The Labor Party had actively pursued White Australia since 1905, when, at its 
federal conference it had pledged to cultivate ‘an Australian sentiment based upon the 
maintenance of racial purity and the development... of an enlightened and self-reliant 
community’.205 Evatt had been involved with the Party at both state and federal level consistently, 
although to fluctuating degrees, since he was elected to represent the working class seat of 
Balmain in Premier Lang’s New South Wales Government of 1925. His involvement with the 
labour movement was not merely political but infiltrated his work at the bar and on the bench of 
the High Court. From 1920 to 1921 he acted as counsel for the Australian Railways Union before 
a Royal Commission into the victimisation of unionists during the 1917 railway strike.206 In 1925, 
he succeeded in stopping the deportation of the trade union militants Tom Walsh and Jacob 
Johnson.207  
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Christopher Waters has argued that fear of Asia and devotion to White Australia bordered upon 
hysteria and were almost universal within the labour movement. Evatt’s advocacy of complex 
and seemingly incompatible ideals sits comfortably with the chaos of competing interests that 
Waters has suggested influenced the Curtin and Chifley governments in the 1940s. Within the 
movement, ‘isolationism competed with internationalism, pro-Empire traditions competed with 
nationalist traditions... and there was a strong element of racism’.208 Restrictive immigration was 
not however, entirely compatible with the values of the labour and unionist movements. There 
was a clear tension between the discourses of whiteness upon which Australia had been federated 
and the universally inclusive approach of socialism. White Australia for Evatt was less a matter 
of legislating racial intolerance, than it was about preserving Australian standards of living and a 
white culture shared by the dominions.  
 
Although White Australia was seen as an essential means of securing the rights of the white 
worker against an influx of cheap labour,209 it also contradicted the universalism that underpinned 
the global socialist movement. As Marilyn Lake has identified in her work on Curtin, 
international socialism adhered to a principle of ‘no concern for race or frontier’. It was about a 
global humanity and a shared, transnational struggle to secure workers’ rights.210 When in 1926, 
Evatt travelled to London to attend the World Migration Conference convened by the 
International Federation of Trade Unions and the Labour and Socialist International, he strongly 
upheld the White Australia policy. Yet, while he objected to the Conference’s ‘uncompromising 
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expression of absolute freedom of migration’ he remained concerned to improve the conditions of 
workers throughout the world.211  
 
In a way analogous to Curtin, Evatt reconciled the racially discriminatory agenda of White 
Australia with the conflicting ideal of a united global socialism, not by suggesting that Australia 
should permit entry to the world’s workers, but by promoting improvement in workers’ rights and 
standards of living internationally. Evatt, like Curtin, believed that Australia’s immigration policy 
may be ameliorated if ‘international trade and international relations were better conducted’.212 
Australia’s standards of living would not be devastated by an incursion of cheap labour if 
prospective immigrants had high living standards in their own country.213 This rationale was 
conterminous with the Federal Government’s practice of inserting reciprocity clauses into 
immigration treaties. The ideology behind it being that if other countries, particularly in Asia, 
sought to protect their own migration schemes, then White Australia would be viewed less as a 
policy of racial discrimination and more as a justified act of economic protectionism. To achieve 
this result Evatt placed faith in the capacity of international bodies to improve global living 
standards. In promoting global economic and social security Evatt could alleviate the perceived 
severity of White Australia, and rationalise the incongruity between it and other postwar 
humanitarian ideals to which he fervently subscribed. It was for this reason that Evatt pushed for 
implementation in the UN Charter of a pledge on behalf of all members to pursue full 
employment, for if the citizens of every nation were prosperous, Australian protection of 
Australian jobs might not be so offensive.214  
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When in the 1940s Evatt had left the court and entered federal politics, he relied frequently upon 
the fallacious justifications for White Australia that saturated the vernacular of Australian 
diplomats as they tried to defend an increasingly indefensible policy.215 He more readily 
employed a defence of the policy that rationalised it as ‘essential for economic and social 
reasons’.216 In 1943 he argued that the White Australia Policy was ‘based not so much upon racial 
discrimination as upon hard practical facts’. He reiterated labour movement concerns that ‘a 
White country which opens its doors to Asiatic migration practically invites a lower standard of 
living’.217 Evatt was not merely parroting party policy. On the contrary, he was said to have run 
his department as something of a ‘one man show’.218 Rather, he was drawing on an established 
Labor discourse that associated workers’ rights with the development of a liberal and democratic 
state.219 He remained influenced by labour movement concerns for white jobs, and by the 
eugenicist thinking that suggested non-European or non-British races were too far removed from 
the civilised practices of ‘white’ culture to participate effectively in a democratic system.220  
 
The argument that Evatt was influenced solely by a positive intention to protect white workers 
rather than by a negative racism may seem to some extent inadequate. For by the time Evatt 
entered federal politics he must have been acutely aware of the resentment that Australia’s 
immigration policy excited amongst her Asian and Pacific neighbours.221 However, the extent to 
which race thinking, and anti-Asian sentiment in particular, was promulgated during the Second 
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World War, should not be underestimated. It made White Australia, in the eyes of its supporters, 
all the more pertinent. Brawley, in his history of the relationship between foreign policy and 
immigration, has argued that propaganda produced by both Australia and Japan throughout the 
conflict continually emphasised that disputes over immigration had contributed to the cause of the 
war. The Japanese persistently criticised the transparent racism of immigration restriction, while 
Australian public dialogue was pervaded by references to the impending Japanese invasion. 
Misunderstandings about Japanese population growth and expansionist objectives fuelled 
concerns that the war would mean the end of White Australia.222 Contemporaneously, the 
dominions were struggling against pressure from Britain and the United States to concede to 
Chinese demands for an end to immigration exclusion and a treaty that publicly declared racial 
equality. There was certainly some support for Chinese immigration in Australia that developed 
out of a sense of gratitude for the Chinese war effort.223 Despite such support and against 
mounting pressure upon External Affairs’ officers positioned throughout Asia,224 Australia 
continued to resist Asiatic immigration and Chinese attempts to challenge what Evatt described as 
the ‘fundamental national policy’ of White Australia.225 
 
The Aftermath of Article 2 (7) 
Once the Charter had been signed and the UN began to operate, the issue of domestic jurisdiction 
proved problematic on many occasions. When debating whether an issue was one of domestic 
jurisdiction, Evatt tended to make distinctions between those nations which had fought fascism 
and those which had not.226 Although he rallied against the interference of the UN in state 
sovereignty in countries such as Australia, Evatt seemed to have no problem arguing upon the 
ways in which other nations should be governed. He argued that Italy should be governed by a 
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‘genuinely democratic regime capable of eliminating Fascist remnants’.227 In 1946, Britain was 
advising against interfering with the Franco regime on the grounds that its policies were 
essentially within Spain’s domestic jurisdiction. In contrast, Evatt was advising his delegates that 
‘a government of Fascist origin and tendencies may adopt policies... which will seriously threaten 
the maintenance of international peace and security.’228 Evatt justified an intrusion of state 
sovereignty by arguing that there could be exceptions ‘where a policy actively pursued 
domestically was also directed deliberately towards international friction so that it was not merely 
or essentially a matter of domestic concern’.229 Similarly, Evatt worked hard to involve the UN in 
the internal policies of the Greek Government in 1947. He recognised the extent to which the 
nation’s problems were based on internal oppression and the autocratic nature of the Government. 
He was confined however by the terms of the UN’s mandate being restricted to the protection of 
political independence and territorial integrity230 making the matter little more than a border 
dispute.231  
 
Hans Kelsen argued, in the immediate aftermath of San Francisco, that Article 2 (7) negated any 
means by which human rights, which were primarily the concern of each state, could be 
safeguarded. Arguing from a purely legal standpoint, (one that Evatt would have appreciated), 
Kelsen derisively refuted the idea that human rights were any better protected in the final Charter 
than they had been when scarcely mentioned in the Dumbarton Oaks draft.232 In pushing his 
amendment to Article 2 (7) Evatt was sacrificing the efficacy of the UN and the ideals of 
internationalism to the conservation of old-fashioned Westphalian sovereignty. Historian of the 
UN, Robert Hildebrand, has argued that many of the shortcomings of the organisation have not 
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228 Cablegram, Department of External Affairs to Hodgson, Document 140, Canberra, 24 March 1946, 
AA:A1838 T189, 854/10/2, DAFP, Volume 9, 1946, January – June DFAT. 
229 Cablegram, Department of External Affairs to Hodgson, Document 178, Canberra, 9 April 1946, AA:A3196, 
1946, 0.6997/98 DAFP, Volume 9, 1946, January – June DFAT. 
230 Letter, Atyeo to Evatt, 13 March 1947, EC, Folder: UN Balkan Commission. 
231 Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, pp. 307 – 311. 
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resulted merely out of a failure of application since 1945 but were built into the Charter itself as 
the language of national security replaced the vocabulary of peace.233 Evatt’s failure after San 
Francisco to involve the UN in struggles against fascist governments illuminates the damaging 
effect that the ban on intervention in domestic matters had the potential to impose. 
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Chapter III 
 
Trusteeship and Australian Involvement in Papua New 
Guinea 
 
At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, representatives of the UN’s member states accepted 
that a declaration concerning the rights, interests and aspirations of non-self governing peoples 
should be included in the Charter of the new world organisation. Under Article 73 of the Charter, 
inhabitants of non-self governing territories would have their well-being promoted to the utmost 
by their administering state. Each administering state also agreed to assist in the progressive 
development of self-government and free political institutions and to take due account of the 
political aspirations of the peoples of each territory.234 Under chapters XII and XIII a new system 
was established for placing territories under international trusteeship, and for monitoring their 
operation and administration. Reference to trusteeship was absent from the original Dumbarton 
Oaks draft and so formal proposals were put forward at San Francisco by the four sponsoring 
powers and France and Australia.235 Despite Evatt’s tendency to overstate Australia’s role in the 
formulation of the trusteeship system,236 his primary objectives for trusteeship were generally in 
line with the ambitions of the major powers. Evatt expected a general pledge covering all non-
self-governing territories and also specific arrangements for implementation of that pledge.237 
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This was essentially the substance of the working paper drawn up by American delegate 
Commander Harold Stassen, which brought together the common principles of each delegation’s 
proposal.238 
 
Throughout the Second World War, debate over the viability of old-world Empires and the 
morality of colonialism exacerbated antagonism between Britain and the United States.239 Anti-
colonial sentiment in the US was widespread. President Roosevelt often evoked the powerful 
discourse of the American Revolution against Britain’s colonial practices and in so doing made 
complex questions of colonial administration static. Policy makers in the British Commonwealth 
were often frustrated by the simplifying effect of such language. In an article submitted for the 
Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations240 by the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs (an organisation with substantial influence on the Department of External 
Affairs241), P. D. Phillips noted that: 
 
criticisms of imperialism have too often been promoted by a vague sentiment, 
uniformed by factual knowledge, of the difficulties of colonial government, of 
the slow rate of social evolution amongst backward peoples... It is clearly true 
to say that at the outbreak of the war, and for the first year or so of hostilities, 
these errors of judgment were conspicuous in... public discussion of an 
uniformed character. The result was a dangerous development conspicuous in 
Anglo-American relations.242 
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The British and particularly Churchill remained sceptical about the intentions of American policy 
makers, believing post-war expansion to be the primary motivation behind talk of trusteeship.243 
Indeed, views on postwar policy for dependent peoples were not uniform among American 
officials. The State Department was principally responsible for driving the international 
discussion of the status of non-self-governing territories. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, 
advocated progress towards self-government and timetables for independence in more advanced 
colonies.244 He spoke of trusteeship as a matter very close to his heart, one to which both he and 
his department had devoted intense thought and many hours of work and study.245 In contrast to 
the liberal views of State Department officials, the US Navy and Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed 
trusteeship, fearing international intervention in the former Japanese mandated islands which 
were of great strategic importance to the security of the Pacific.246 The views of the US Navy 
were certainly influential among policy makers and in Congress, despite the idealism of public 
rhetoric. Raymond Dennett, in an article published on the opening day of the San Francisco 
Conference, noted that arguments of the US Navy concerning America’s strategic requirements 
for bases in the Pacific would fall on ‘sympathetic Congressional ears’. He was also convinced 
that the public would support American control of the Pacific islands in view of the American 
lives lost fighting to secure them.247 
 
Evatt’s Position on Trusteeship 
Evatt was not obliged to express any views that were repugnant to his personal sensibilities on 
trusteeship at San Francisco.248 The official Australian policy on trusteeship had been decided 
                                                            
243 Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 8. 
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early in the war. The main feature of it was to promote the ‘welfare and advancement of native 
peoples’.249 Evatt’s rhetoric at San Francisco was simply a continuation of the views he had been 
expressing during the previous three years.250 No doubt Evatt, who had written on the British 
mandates in 1934 and who was well versed in both the history and legal dimension of the 
trusteeship question,251 was instrumental in outlining the official Australian position. Evatt has 
been credited with pursing a very liberal agenda in the trusteeship negotiations and history has 
accorded him more recognition in this area than he perhaps deserves.252 Kylie Tennant has 
suggested that Evatt not only proposed a system of reporting to advisory bodies, but further that 
he proposed the general principle of the primacy of welfare and development to the 
administration of non-self governing territories.253 Certainly, this is a claim the Australian 
delegation made. When Commission II (General Assembly) came together at San Francisco to 
hear the report of the trusteeship committee, Forde noted that the Australian Delegation was the 
‘first to propose officially... that the chapter on trusteeship should contain a declaration of 
principles’.254 While this may be true, the idea of a declaration of principles had been a 
foundational aspect of American dialogue on trusteeship for many years prior to San Francisco. 
In fact, Evatt relied upon the history of the idea to promote the extension of principles to all 
dependent peoples.255 He recalled the commitment made by the League of Nations to foster the 
well-being and development of those peoples ‘not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
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253 Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice, p. 168. 
254 ‘Verbatim Minutes of Third Meeting of Commission II’, 21 June 1945, Document 1144, Documents of the 
United Nations Volume 8, p. 136. 
255 Evatt, ‘Territorial Trusteeship’, pp. 31 – 32. 
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strenuous conditions of the modern world’256 and the objective of the Atlantic Charter to secure 
freedom from want and fear for ‘all men’.257  
 
It is true that Evatt’s appeal for the principles of trusteeship to extend to all dependent peoples 
was a step further than the British were initially willing to go. When representatives of 
Commonwealth countries met in London in early April 1945, the British had every intention of 
strongly resisting any proposal that might be put forward by the United States for multiple or 
international mandates. The British were only willing to accept a single-power system similar to 
the mandates created under the League of Nations where a one parent-state took responsibility for 
a non-self governing territory.258 In many ways, their aim was simply to continue their empire, 
albeit pledging to better administer each colony and to protect the interests of the natives therein. 
They did not wish to be accountable to any international body beyond the degree to which they 
had been under the previous mandates system. Britain wanted only to continue the previous 
system and to bring into it the soon to be annexed enemy territories. In response to the British 
proposal, put forward by Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Stanley, Evatt advocated a 
general statement of principles that he hoped would apply to all dependent people, whether or not 
they lived in mandated or ex-enemy territories. In so doing, he saw himself simply keeping up 
with international public opinion. He argued that such recognition would be a ‘logical and almost 
inevitable development from past policies and statements’. Evatt conceded that ‘international 
concern in the welfare of dependent peoples had increased and would increase in future. Public 
interest was real and criticism could not be avoided’. Failure by British Commonwealth countries 
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to acknowledge their responsibilities to territories under their administration would not only 
provoke criticism but would suggest that colonial powers had something to hide.259  
 
Later, at San Francisco, Evatt would emphasise the need for a system of accountability that would 
be imposed upon administering powers if necessary.260 He believed not only that the principles of 
welfare and development should be applied comprehensively but that the requirement of 
reporting to the UN should be made obligatory rather than voluntary.261 Evatt was instrumental in 
having inserted into the Charter a duty upon administering powers to report to the UN.262 Article 
73 (e) required administering powers ‘to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General... 
information... relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which 
they are respectively responsible’.263 This provision would later act as a technical aid to colonised 
peoples seeking independence, a consequence that Evatt did not foresee and actually opposed.264 
Evatt did not go significantly further than the British position. His proposal to extend principles 
of welfare to all dependant peoples had been foreshadowed in a Draft Constitution of 
International Organization prepared by the US Department of State in July 1943.265 He did not 
suggest that non-self-governing territories should be administered by an international body, the 
consequence of which would be the relinquishing of all control over Australia’s interests in Papua 
and New Guinea and the collapse of all European empires. Rather, he wished the new 
international body to have advisory functions and to be empowered to make reports and visit 
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dependent territories.266 Furthermore, he did not suggest that administering powers should be 
forced to enter into trusteeship agreements. While Evatt supported international supervision, he 
did not envisage international control and did not promote timetables for independence. As 
Huntley Wright has argued, his ‘position stopped well short of the system of international 
administration proposed by Hull’.267  
 
There were more liberal positions than Evatt’s put forward at San Francisco. Carlos P. Romulo, 
head of the Philippine delegation, proposed that the term ‘independence’ be inserted as a general 
principle of trusteeship in the chapter’s preamble, arguing that in doing so, he was speaking for 
the 600,000,000 people not represented at the Conference.268 Delegates representing the NAACP, 
Mary McLeod Bethune, Walter White and W. E. B. DuBois, demanded an end to colonialism, a 
transition to autonomy and representation for colonised peoples on the Trusteeship Council.269 
Iraqi delegate, Fadhil al-Jamali, criticised the new trusteeship system on the night that the fourth 
Committee was meeting to congratulate itself on finalising an outline for the system. He argued 
that it disregarded the wishes of dependant peoples as to their choice of administering power, 
denied them access to the Trusteeship Council and provided no specific regulation as to how a 
trusteeship could be terminated.270 Even the Soviets pushed for the UN to have greater control 
over colonial administration. Head of the Soviet Delegation, Vyacheslav Molotov, stated at a 
press conference on 7 May, that dependent countries must be enabled to ‘take the path of 
independence’.271 Having no direct responsibility (at least in a formal sense) for colonies, meant 
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that the Soviets were free to present themselves as the vanguard of anti-colonialism.272 Evatt’s 
position on trusteeship was out of step with progressive internationalist discourses in the postwar 
period primarily because these discourses were incompatible with his ideas on race and his vision 
for Australian dominance in the Pacific. It was in the Australian Trust Territory of Papua New 
Guinea that the tensions between these various ideologies became most apparent. 
 
Tutoring the Uncivilised: A Gradualist Position 
The term ‘independence’ was ideologically loaded in the postwar period and strenuously avoided 
by even those who considered themselves opposed to colonialism. William Roger Louis has 
argued that Roosevelt, like Wilson before him, was a gradualist who ‘foresaw the possible 
independence of colonial peoples only after a period of tutelage by the ‘parent’ states’.273 Cordell 
Hull recalled in his memoirs the ‘irremovable objection’ to the word ‘independence’ of British 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.274 In his analysis of Evatt’s position, Louis suggests that Evatt 
too was a gradualist and that although he probably did not envisage independence for New 
Guinea in the twentieth century, ‘he would not have opposed it’ had it occurred.275 On the 
contrary, although Evatt was insisting in late 1945 that the UN could only be effective ‘if its legal 
and constitutional framework’ met the ‘growing and changing needs of the peoples of the 
world’276, eight years later he was still insisting that the granting of autonomy to Papua New 
Guinea would result in ‘disorder, anarchy and the destruction of tribal life’.277 
 
The great empires had never disguised their concerns about the trusteeship provisions. The 
French, like the British, wanted only an extension of previous systems governing ex-mandatory 
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and ex-enemy territories.278 A completely opposing view was taken by the Chinese279 and 
Soviet280 delegates who insisted that the Charter should recommend the ‘development to 
independence’ of colonial peoples.281 The term independence was initially favoured by the 
American delegation also, but concerns over losing Hawaii to a nationalist ideal eventually 
changed the minds of most delegates. They managed to still appear to support independence 
however, by including the term in chapter XII as an objective of the system rather than in the 
declaration of principles in chapter XI which mentioned only self-government.282 The Americans 
had also managed to secure their own strategic interests in ex-Japanese mandated Pacific islands 
with the insertion of an exclusion clause for ‘strategic areas’. Any function of the UN concerning 
those strategic areas was to be exercised by the Security Council where the US had the veto 
power.283  
 
In the postwar period international momentum for change to the style of colonial administration 
that had dominated nineteenth century political relationships increased. Leland Goodrich, in one 
of his many analyses of the UN, noted that the war ‘had so discredited colonialism as to make it 
no longer defensible in traditional terms’.284 Although nineteenth century scientific claims of 
inherent racial difference could no longer be applied to colonial peoples, this did not mean that 
colonial practices did not continue under the guise of a reformed rhetoric. Scott MacWilliam has 
recently argued that the impetus for change merely forced a renegotiation of the relationship 
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between nationalism and British Imperialism.285 Evatt endorsed the ideals of welfare, universal 
full employment, economic development and human rights because he believed that global 
security was dependent upon the elimination of human suffering. He subscribed to the ideal of 
positive peace; that peace was a condition needing to be actively maintained.286 Evatt referred 
frequently to Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms Speech and the language of the American-British 
Atlantic Charter of 1942.287He maintained that Australian security, development and prosperity 
were conditional upon the collaboration of peace loving nations to ensure that ‘all men in all the 
lands shall live out their lives in freedom from fear and want’.288 This reliance upon rights based 
discourses however, obscured the actual policies of the Australian Government in the Pacific and 
specifically in Papua New Guinea. The rhetoric of trusteeship and Australia’s commitments to 
colonial reform were inseparable from Australia’s strategic and commercial interests in the 
Pacific.289  
 
While Evatt was promoting universal welfare and self-governance for dependant peoples, 
Australia was ‘building an empire’ in Papua New Guinea. In late 1946 Australia submitted to the 
General Assembly a trusteeship agreement on New Guinea in accordance with Articles 78, 79 
and 81 of the Charter. Under the agreement, Australia’s powers of administration were extended 
rather than limited. Papua was brought into joint administration with New Guinea and, unlike the 
restrictive position of their previous mandate, Australia was able to secure the islands 
militarily.290 Chifley wanted the agreement to obtain for Australia ‘complete and exclusive power 
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in controlling the administration of New Guinea’.291 While public officials in Australia habitually 
criticised archaic colonial traditions, in practice, they could be continued and defended with 
reference to the new ‘positive colonialism’.292 Evatt unambiguously stated on many occasions 
that native welfare operated concurrently with economic and military involvement in what he 
considered a ‘vital strategic area’.293  
 
In practice, the rhetoric of humanitarian treatment of dependent peoples worked concurrently 
with an expansionist political agenda in Papua New Guinea. With his professed purpose being to 
ameliorate the economic condition of the natives, Evatt could combine the ethics of trusteeship 
with the pursuit of economic benefits for Australia. MacWilliam has argued that Evatt and 
Commander in Chief of the Australian Armed Forces, Sir Thomas Blamey, had analogous views 
on the duality of ethical principles and commercial advantage. Blamey was advising the 
Commonwealth Government in 1944 that Australia could ‘use policy on the highest moral level 
as a justified weapon of power politics to protect not only the future of the native peoples... but 
the strategic security of Australia’. In Papua New Guinea he saw morality coinciding happily 
with expediency.294 Similarly Evatt’s constant espousal of the principles of welfare and economic 
justice operated in Papua New Guinea to justify a continued Australian presence there. He wrote 
in The Daily Telegraph in 1943 that there was room for great industrial expansion for Australia in 
the undeveloped markets of the north and that never had a ‘good neighbour policy’ been more 
desirable in the interests of all concerned.295 For Evatt, his faith in the concept of positive peace 
as a means of preventing war, was contingent upon administering powers raising the standard of 
living in each trust territory and ensuring that the ‘ordinary man’ had opportunities for 
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employment and could share in the ‘benefits of modern means of production’. This charitable 
proposal would benefit not only dependent peoples but would also ‘increase world trade and thus 
benefit the peoples of other countries’.296  
 
The gradualist position of most allied leaders was not so different to nineteenth century 
justifications of colonialism based upon the civilising missions of western states in the innately 
uncivilised cultures they occupied. International law academic, Antony Anghie, in his recent 
work on imperialism and sovereignty, argued that in the twentieth century the problem of cultural 
difference was no longer presented in terms of a distinction between civilised and uncivilised but 
rather in terms of the ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’. Essentially it signalled a shift from racial and 
cultural to economic categorisation of difference. This shift did not operate to eliminate power 
imbalances. In contrast, it imbued international law with new types of control and management. 
Measuring the advancement of a people by reference to economic criteria was in many ways 
more dangerous than previous civilisational discourses because it replaced a vocabulary that was 
ostensibly racist with a series of concepts that appeared neutral and quantifiable.297 The threat of 
continued imperial domination that lurked behind the idealism of global welfare and in the 
infantilising terminology of colonial ‘tutelage’ and ‘parent-states’ did not go unnoticed in the 
postwar period. NAACP representative at San Francisco, Walter White, argued in 1945 that ‘the 
United States, Great Britain, France, and other Allied nations must choose without delay one of 
two courses – to revolutionise their racial concepts and practices, to abolish imperialism and grant 
full equality to all of its peoples or else prepare for World War Three. Another Versailles Treaty 
providing for ‘mandates’, ‘protectorates’, and other devices for white domination will make such 
a war inevitable (emphasis mine)’.298  
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Australian Interests in the Pacific 
In Evatt’s vision for the postwar world, Australia would play a dominant role in maintaining 
security in the Pacific. In a speech given at the San Francisco Commercial Club in April 1945 
Evatt declared that ‘having fought in two wars to preserve democracy and international decency’ 
Australia considered itself a Security power, ‘that is to say, a power not only willing and able 
instantly to fight for the maintenance of international order but also awake to the issues and ready 
to take an initiative toward decisions affecting the maintenance of international order’.299 
Australia’s location in the Asia-Pacific region however, meant that race was destined to 
substantially affect the role Australia would play and the kind of policies a postwar government 
would bring to the region. White Australia remained a central part of this vision. Evatt argued in 
1943 that Australia’s security in the Pacific was contingent upon population growth based upon 
‘the principle of White Australia’ and the ‘encouragement of migration of suitable migrants’ 
(emphasis mine).300 The Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 1944 also contained a provision 
that every government had the right to control immigration to all territories within its 
jurisdiction.301 The agreement, of which Evatt had been the principal author, was formulated in 
response to Evatt’s frustration over not being consulted by the major powers in key negotiations 
for postwar reconstruction. Failure to consult Australia left Evatt with a fear that all post war 
settlements would continue to be determined exclusively by the major powers.302 The Australian-
New Zealand Agreement was a result of Evatt’s anger that ‘decisions affecting the future of 
certain portions of the Pacific and vitally affecting both Australia and New Zealand were not only 
                                                            
299 Evatt, ‘Summary of a Speech given by Evatt at the San Francisco Commercial Club’.  
300 Evatt, ‘Australia’s Future Role in the Pacific’, p. 133. 
301 Clause 32, Australian-New Zealand Agreement 1944, Document 26, Canberra, 21 January 1944, Foreign 
Affairs, Australian Treaty Collection, DAFP, Volume 7, 1944, DFAT; See also Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘Statement 
Issued by the Minister for External Affairs on the Official Release of the Full Text of the Australian-New 
Zealand Agreement, 21 January 1944’, Foreign Policy of Australia, p. 157. 
302 Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938 - 1965 (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1967), p. 73. 
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made but publicly announced without any prior reference either to the Australian or the New 
Zealand Government’.303  
 
In the Agreement Evatt took the bold step of asserting territorial aspirations and making clear his 
intention to make Australia a key player in the Pacific region. The Agreement brashly stipulated 
that disposal of Pacific territory after the war should only be done in consultation with both 
Australia and New Zealand.304 Wright has noted that their territorial ambitions resulted from a 
fear of American domination in the Pacific305 yet Evatt was certainly keen to have an American 
military presence north of the equator, believing that such a scenario would improve ‘the security 
of Australia and the whole world’. He wanted ‘reciprocal facilities’ whereby both ‘America and 
Australia should have access to American bases in the Philippines’.306 In 1944, Evatt was arguing 
for the restoration of the French Empire in contrast to the views of American and South African 
leaders. He also envisaged extension of Australian sovereignty over the New Hebrides, at least to 
the extent that Australia should ‘take over the British share of the condominium’.307 Evatt hoped 
that Australia could develop a ‘buffer zone’ to safeguard Australia from the north ‘that would 
include Portuguese Timor, Dutch and Australian New Guinea (including New Britain and New 
Ireland), the Solomons, the New Hebrides and New Caledonia’.308 
 
Huntley Wright has suggested that when Evatt spoke of economic justice as a fundamental 
prerequisite for peace he was not referring to the administration of Papua New Guinea, rather he 
                                                            
303 Cablegram, Evatt to Johnson, Document 56, Canberra, 24 February 1944, AA:A989, 44/735/168/20, DAFP, 
Volume 7, 1944, DFAT; See also Crockett, Evatt: A Life, pp. 203 – 205; and C. Hartley Grattan, ‘Australia and 
New Zealand Agree’, 1944, EC, Folder: Australian New Zealand Pact, January to April 1944. 
304 Clauses 24 – 28, Australian-New Zealand Agreement 1944, Document 26, Canberra, 21 January 1944, 
Foreign Affairs, Australian Treaty Collection, DAFP, Volume 7, 1944, DFAT. 
305 Wright, ‘Protecting the National Interest’, p. 67. 
306 Arthur Evans, ‘Australia Asks Use of American Bases in Pacific’, Chicago Daily Tribune, May 4, 1945, p. 8. 
See also cable in which Evatt makes clear his preference for the United States rather than the Soviet Union to 
retain primary control over Japan, Cable from Evatt to Makin, 4 November 1945, EC, Folder: External Affairs – 
Japan - Far Eastern Commission.  
307 Cablegram, Evatt to Curtin, Document 132, Canberra, 5 May 1944, AA:A989, 43/735/302, DAFP, Volume 7, 
1944, DFAT. 
308 Buckey et al., Doc Evatt, p. 232; de Matos, ‘Encouraging Democracy’, pp. 4 – 5. 
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was arguing for the need to bring an end to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Wright 
contends that Evatt based his case for colonial reform upon the ‘illegitimate’ imperialism of the 
Japanese Empire and not on the ‘reality of non-development’ in Papua New Guinea.309 Evatt was 
undoubtedly critical of the Japanese Empire which during the war extended to Manchuria, China, 
the Philippines, the Netherland Indies, French Indo-China, Thailand, British Malaya, Burma, 
Papua and New Guinea. Commentators on Japan in the west also argued that an intention existed 
to extend the sphere to Australia, New Zealand and India.310 Evatt was appalled by the ‘atrocious 
cruelties’ committed by Japanese soldiers311 and as such became passionate about the prosecution 
of Axis leaders for war crimes. He called for the trial of Japanese Emperor Hirohito when no 
other Allied leaders thought it advisable. As Malcolm Booker has noted, the Allies had just 
committed, ‘without real military need, one of the greatest war crimes in history’, the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trying the Japanese for war crimes was thus viewed by 
some as ‘judgement by the greater criminals of the lesser’.312 The morality of western war aims 
had been severely damaged by the bombings and diminished the sense of pride in victory for 
many.313 In September 1945, Evatt made a statement in London on Japanese war-crimes, calling 
for the prosecution of perpetrators in battle and the leaders of what he labelled a ‘system of 
terrorism’.314  
 
In his internationalist rhetoric on positive peace and the importance of Native welfare, Evatt had 
compartmentalised the colonies and former mandates of democratic western states from those 
that were run by governments that he viewed as essentially fascist. In his capacity as chairman of 
                                                            
309 Wright, ‘Protecting the National Interest’, p. 67. 
310 A. J. Grajdanzev, ‘Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere’, Pacific Affairs, Volume 16, No. 3 (September 1943), p. 
311. 
311 Herbert Vere Evatt, CPD, House of Representatives, Volume 180, 30 November 1944, p. 2531. 
312 Booker, The Last Domino, p. 71. 
313 Denis William Brogan, Price of Revolution (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1951), p. 210. 
314 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘Japanese Atrocities and War Crimes’, Statement made in London on 10 September 
1945, accompanying a report prepared by Sir William Webb on Japanese atrocities and war crimes committed in 
the South West Pacific Area, in Evatt, Australia in World Affairs, pp. 65 – 67. 
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a working committee for the Far Eastern Commission, Evatt reported in November 1945 on the 
principles and objectives of postwar surrender policy for Japan. Included in the recommendations 
was democratic governance in conjunction with limitations upon Japan’s sovereignty and 
complete demilitarisation.315 The gradualist discourses to which Evatt subscribed allowed him to 
negotiate the major tension of the trusteeship system. He was able to endorse the idealism of 
welfare and democratic freedoms so central to international oratory on trusteeship, while 
concurrently advancing Australia’s status as a Pacific power and consolidating Australian control 
over Papua New Guinea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
315 Letter and Report of the Working Committee, written by Evatt in his capacity as Chairman, Washington 
D.C., 15 November 1945, EC, Folder: External Affairs - Japan - Far Eastern Commission.  
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Conclusion 
 
In 1946, when at the Paris Peace Conference, Evatt was asked by a Swiss reporter to define 
democracy. After providing a straight-forward description of electoral processes, Evatt stated that 
Allied soldiers had come to Europe to ‘help overthrow tyranny’ because they ‘believed in 
democracy and they believed in it enough to fight for it and to die for it far away from their 
homes and their loved ones’.316 Evatt’s vision for a postwar world was founded upon his belief 
that ‘peace is not merely the absence of war’.317 He had faith in the positive notion that increased 
living standards through full employment and the granting of democratic freedoms would prevent 
the frustrations that lead states and individuals to resort to armed aggression. Evatt therefore 
regarded the UN as more than a vehicle through which to police international relations318 or to 
impose obligations upon states restricting the use of force. Evatt was unequivocal when he stated 
that ‘a permanent system of security can be made effective and acceptable only if it has a 
foundation in economic justice’.319 In the postwar period, the belief that global democracy was a 
necessary condition of peace was well established and was an essential philosophy of the UN.320 
It is the commitment that Evatt showed to ‘a world in which the Four Freedoms of President 
Roosevelt would be a reality’321 that has led both political historians and Evatt’s biographers and 
contemporaries to label him an ‘internationalist’.  
                                                            
316 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘What is Democracy: Evatt Tells the World’, Paris Peace Conference, 1946, EC, Folder: 
Evatt Publications – Articles and Essays. 
317 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘Australia and America’, University of California Charter Address, March 1945, in 
Evatt, Australia in World Affairs, p. 15. 
318 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘Postwar Planning: Ministerial Statement by Dr Evatt in the House of Representatives, 
19 July 1944’, in Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia, p. 208. 
319 ‘World Organisation: Ministerial Statement by Dr. Evatt in the House of Representatives, 8 September 
1944’, in Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia, p. 215. 
320 Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press and Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 
55. 
321 Evatt, The Task of Nations, p. 235; and see the draft of this speech, ‘Talk by Dr. Evatt, President of the 
United Nations Assembly from 1948 to 1949’, ABC Radio, in AA: SP369/1, 1697, Box 3: The United Nations. 
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As it pertains to Evatt, the label ‘internationalist’ does not however, provide a straightforward 
means by which to classify and categorise his views, his policies, and his ideological 
understanding of the way in which a postwar world would operate. Evatt’s pursuit of an 
independent foreign policy through an ‘extension of [Australia’s] external commitments’322 in the 
Pacific and involvement in multilateral diplomatic forums was not simply a rejection of the 
supremacy of Whitehall. It is certainly true that Evatt’s pursuit of an autonomous international 
personality for Australia was a pioneering step for Australian foreign affairs. His actions went 
against the grain of popular opinion in Australia. In response to the independent position Evatt 
adopted at the San Francisco Conference, Robert Menzies declared, that ‘whilst a new world 
Charter may have a value which is as yet untried, our relationship with the British Empire has a 
value which has been proved in circumstances of very great trial over many generations’.323 Polls 
taken in 1945 and 1946 showed that only thirty percent of the Australian population supported the 
promotion of a foreign policy independent from that of Britain and other dominions. Amongst 
non-Labor Party supporters that figure dropped to a mere sixteen percent.324 Evatt’s strategy to 
have Australia recognised internationally was not only innovative but was also successful. In 
1942, the American publication Pacific Affairs noted that the Australian Government was ‘no 
longer content to follow the leadership of the United Kingdom’ and had begun to act 
‘independently on a footing of national equality’.325 The author, G. W. Warnecke, paid particular 
attention to Evatt, declaring that Evatt had given up ‘his seat on the High Court bench because of 
his conviction that Australia was now adrift on uncharted international seas, with the guiding 
lights of an older epoch flickering out’.326  
                                                            
322 Frederic W. Eggleston, Foreword to Australia in World Affairs by Evatt, Canberra, 1 August 1946, p. vii.  
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in Norman Harper and David Sissons, Australia and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 
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324 Australian Gallup Polls, Nos 314 – 26, December 1945 – January 1946; Nos 264 – 71, May 1945, quoted in 
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325 G. W. Warnecke, ‘Australia in the United Nations’, Pacific Affairs Volume 15, No. 2 (June 1942), p. 133. 
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Equality of race, gender and nation were all recognised in the preamble of the Charter formulated 
at San Francisco. In the chapters on trusteeship however, gradualist discourses that graded 
colonised peoples as dependent or backward, meant that the ideal of equality did not exist in 
practice. The nationalist agenda that Evatt pursued, securing a greater role for Australia in the 
Pacific as a security power, resulted in Australia reinforcing its control over Papua New Guinea. 
Despite the centrality of ‘native welfare’ to official Australian policy, such welfare remained 
inherently connected to strategic and commercial interests. Although it may not be possible to 
judge the sincerity of Evatt’s commitment to the ideals of universal equality that he espoused, it is 
clear that he saw a greater need for the operation of those ideals in colonies and trust territories 
not administered by democratic states. Evatt had been committed to democratic principles since 
he had first penned his essay on Australian liberalism in 1918 and throughout his international 
career he continued to view democracy and fascism as oppositional systems, the former being a 
precondition for peace and the latter, a surety for war. As a result of this ideological segregation, 
Evatt was willing to accept the continuation of colonial practices by Allied governments if they 
were enveloped in a ‘reformed colonial’ discourse that prioritised native welfare.  
 
Evatt’s biographers have been drawn to the national commitment that Evatt demonstrated at a 
time when many Australian citizens still considered themselves principally to be British subjects. 
Yet, historical considerations that place Evatt’s commitment to the nation in opposition to the 
policies of Britain need to be tempered by an understanding of his adhesion to the Crown. Evatt 
did not believe that Australia’s right to exercise all the Prerogatives of sovereignty meant that 
Australia should separate from Britain. On the contrary, he argued that the Federal Government’s 
power to act as a sovereign body in international relations was dependent upon the fluid and 
74 | P a g e  
 
evolving nature of the constitutional relationship that bound Australia to the Crown.327 For Evatt, 
commitment to the monarchical substance of the Constitution was more than a formalistic 
adherence to the letter of the law. The Commonwealth to Evatt was not merely a legal fiction or 
an historical relic, but a political and cultural reality. Through a devotion to the legal framework 
that united the Crown, the colonies and the dominions, Evatt was able to negotiate the tension 
between Australia’s status internationally and the remnants of Britain’s Empire. While this 
framework operated to benefit the culturally comparable dominion states by enhancing their 
international positions and retaining an official and symbolic association with the Crown, it could 
not be made compatible with the ideals of racial equality, anti-colonialism and independence for 
dependent peoples that were so integral to the postwar internationalist agenda. 
 
Although historians have recognised the inconsistency between Evatt’s endorsement of universal 
human rights and defence of White Australia, little focus had previously been paid to the extent to 
which Article 2 (7) went against the intentions and principles of the international community in 
the postwar period. While a changing discourse on the meaning of ‘race’ certainly did not 
eliminate racism from the practice of international politics,328 it did make racial inequality an 
objectionable rationale for discriminatory policies such as White Australia. When Evatt pressured 
delegates at San Francisco to adopt his amendment to restrict the interventionist capabilities of 
the new UN, he was effectively promoting the removal of the final means through which the 
international community could safeguard human rights without resorting to armed enforcement. 
In complete opposition to his advocacy of positive peace, Evatt’s amendment effectively meant 
                                                            
327 Herbert Vere Evatt, ‘Australia in British Commonwealth and World Affairs’, in Evatt, Australia in World 
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328 For an important example of the ways in which anti-racial discourses were not immediately adopted and the 
horrors of Nazism not immediately realised; see Tony Judt’s analysis of the continuation of anti-Semitism in 
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although the Holocaust has now become ‘the very definition and guarantee’ of Europe’s restored humanity, its 
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pp. 803 – 831. 
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that the UN could only react to, rather than prevent, instances where states curtailed the human 
rights of citizens. International lawyer, Lawrence Preuss, argued that if applied literally ‘Article 2 
(7), with its narrow and limitative proviso, would have the effect of paralysing all action by the 
United Nations to bring about the peaceful settlement of any dispute of domestic origin...’329 In 
practice however, the new UN found ways to avoid the rigidity of Article 2 (7). As Rosalyn 
Higgins has argued, matters considered to fall within domestic jurisdiction are ‘incapable of 
capture and crystallisation for all time’.330 As early as 1946, delegates in the General Assembly 
were arguing for intervention to safeguard human rights. Panamanian Foreign Minister, Ricardo 
Alfaro, emphatically declared that human rights had been ‘taken out of the province of domestic 
jurisdiction’ and ‘placed within the realm of international law’ by the Charter formulated at San 
Francisco.331 Alfaro’s view on which matters should be considered domestic and which 
international was clearly very different to the views of Australia and the major powers. This 
discrepancy goes some way to explaining how Evatt’s amendment to Article 2 (7) was passed in 
an international environment so concerned with the formalising of human rights.  
 
In 1995, Gareth Evans argued that Evatt defies easy labelling. In the same speech however, Evans 
went on to label Evatt as ‘Australia’s first genuine internationalist’.332 The term internationalist is 
not easily defined and employing it to characterise Evatt’s ideologies is incredibly problematic. 
Although Evatt publicly devoted himself to the ideals of universal democratic freedom and 
equality and to the concept of international community embodied by the UN, these commitments 
were not the sole criteria upon which he devised Australian foreign policy. Evatt may have been 
inspired by Wendell Willkie’s vision for ‘one world’ but his commitment to the legal substance 
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of the Crown, to the necessity of White Australia, and to the advancement of strategic and 
commercial interests in the Pacific, effectively preserved remnants of the power imbalance 
between white and non-white, sovereign and colonised, backward and advanced, that had 
dominated the pre-war world. 
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